

Federal Republic of Nigeria

Community-Based Agricultural and Rural
Development Programme

PROJECT PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT



Federal Republic of Nigeria

**Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development
Programme**

Project Performance Assessment

Photos of activities supported by Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme

Front cover: Rice processing centre, State of Jigawa.

Back cover: A treadle pump in Dutse, Jigawa (right); Livestock is an important asset in the State of Katsina (left).

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Preface

The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD has undertaken a project performance assessment of the Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The programme was one of the biggest IFAD loan operations in Nigeria, and was the first programme in the country to implement a community-driven development (CDD) approach across a number of states. The programme was based in northern Nigeria, in the poorest part of the country, which has also been affected by years of conflict and the recent Boko Haram insurgency.

The establishment of community development associations as a fourth tier of government was the most important innovation and, as confirmed by this assessment, has created a lasting impact in the programme area. It has provided poor people with a structure and a space to plan community investments and manage them in a sustainable way. For the Government, this structure filled an institutional vacuum and enabled funding to be channelled into hard-to-reach areas. The model was subsequently adopted by other states and development partners.

The assessment of the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CDD approach, which is a trademark feature of IFAD in Nigeria and beyond, was timely and provides important lessons. First, the CDD approach was appropriate for the time and the context, and it was embraced by governments and communities in the northern states. Second, the approach has built on the experiences and lessons from the earlier state-level projects, which were smaller in scale and based in the same cultural context. Third, the decentralized funding approach was consistent with the programme approach; it has built ownership at local levels, which was important to ensure the continued contributions from communities and the Government, although it also caused high administrative overheads. Fourth, the CDD approach has been less effective in addressing power relations and issues of inequality within the communities; this would require additional strategies, in particular for gender. Fifth, the approach could have been more influential if there had been more robust evidence from the programme on what has worked well. Finally, IFAD should have dedicated more effort to establishing a functioning, participatory monitoring and evaluation system and designing robust impact studies.

The assessment was conducted by Johanna Pennarz, Lead Evaluation Officer, in collaboration with senior consultant Nicholas Chapman, evaluation specialist and agronomist. The evaluation team also included Ifeyinwa Achike, and Hauwa El-Yakub. Nicholas Bourguignon, Evaluation Research Analyst, provided valuable inputs into the analysis. Peer reviewers – Mona Bishay, consultant, and Ashwani Muthoo, Deputy Director, IOE – provided comments on the draft report. Maria Cristina Spagnolo and Shaun Ryan, provided valuable administrative support.

IOE is grateful to IFAD's West and Central Africa Division, in particular the Nigeria Country Office, and the participating states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for their invaluable support during the missions and the helpful comments provided during the process.

I hope the results generated by this assessment will be useful to inform and improve IFAD operations and activities in Nigeria for enhanced development effectiveness.



Oscar A. Garcia
Director
Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD

Water melon farm supported by an apex organization, Jigawa.

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Currency equivalent

Currency unit = Nigeria Naira (NGN)

1 US\$ = 198.97 NGN

Abbreviations and acronyms

ADP	Agricultural Development Programme
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agenda
AWPB	Annual Work Programme and Budget
CASP	Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt
CBARDP	Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme
CBPRP	Community-based Poverty Reduction Project
CDA	community development association
CDD	community-driven development
CDF	community development fund
COSOP	country strategic opportunities programme
CPE	country programme evaluation
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FSA	financial service association
KSACDP	Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Programme
LGAs	local government areas
LEEDS	Local Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MTR	mid-term review
NEEDS	National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy
PCR	project completion report
PCRv	project completion report validation
PPA	project performance assessment
PSO	Programme Support Office
RIMS	Results and Impact Management System
SEEDS	State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy
SSACDP	Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Programme
SSO	State Support Office
WCA	West and Central Africa Division (IFAD)

Map of the programme area

Nigeria

Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme

Project Performance Assessment.



The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IFAD concerning the delimitation of the frontiers or boundaries, or the authorities thereof.

Map compiled by IFAD | 29-05-2015

Executive summary

1. The Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP) in Nigeria was selected for a project performance assessment to build IOE's project-level evaluative evidence for the Nigeria country programme evaluation in 2015. Fieldwork was undertaken in Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto States from 2 to 15 July. Because of security concerns, the field mission was unable to visit the North East and so could not verify in any depth the influence of insurgency and violence on programme activities. The assessment had a particular focus on assessing the sustainability of a large number of community organizations and infrastructure created by the programme. For the latter, it used an asset verification tool, which covered 49 assets in 20 villages.
2. CBARDP was designed in a northern Nigerian context of the highest poverty in the country, and covered a huge geographical area. The **programme goal** was "to improve the livelihoods and living conditions of the poor rural communities, with emphasis on women and other vulnerable groups in the seven states participating in the programme". The programme had an initial budget of US\$68.5 million but a three-year loan extension with additional financing in 2010 increased funds by US\$16.9 million. IFAD provided 50 per cent of funding for all categories of expenditure, with the balance to come from Government and beneficiaries.
3. The programme had two components. The **awareness and capacity-building** component conducted awareness-raising and empowerment activities within 207 communities, and 65 local governments. The **community development fund** (CDF) component delivered 28,116 CDF investments across 42 categories. The number of direct beneficiaries reached was 1.2 million, or around half of the original target. The delivery of these interventions was highly concentrated within the selected village areas and local government areas.
4. **Relevance.** At the time of design, Nigeria was facing a challenging political and economic situation. After 30 years of military rule, rural poverty remained deep and persistent, and new approaches were being sought to resolve this seemingly intransigent problem. The Rural Development Strategy, formulated in 2001, was based on core principles of a participatory approach to reflect community needs, capacity building at community and local government levels, the transferring of resources to communities, support for decentralization, and greater equity among groups and by gender. CBARDP's emphasis on strengthening local actors down to village level and enabling communities to determine their own development and to manage their own funds was closely aligned with this policy framework. Besides policy relevance, CBARDP was well-aligned with local government responsibilities and funding. There was generally good buy-in from the seven participating states. CBARDP, as one of the first multi-state programmes applying community-driven development (CDD) methods, was seen as significant in demonstrating how such an approach could be rolled out in a substantial manner.
5. **Effectiveness.** Strengthening and widening the CDD approach across a vast area of northern Nigeria required the systematic sensitization and formation of community groups and community development associations (CDAs), which took place across all 207 selected village areas. From the field visit, out of 27 CDAs visited, all but three were found to be operational, with representatives available to discuss their activities and share their records. The assessment team judged that the CDAs demonstrated reasonable confidence in their relations with local government officials and in managing programme assets. Their financial viability appeared fragile, as they could not demonstrate up-to-date bank records or membership details. But they did show a commitment to maintaining the assets provided under CBARDP, especially the social and community infrastructures.

6. The programme's approaches have been successfully institutionalized. Federal, state and local government systems were adapted to channel resources directly to communities, and credit agencies have provided substantial credit flows. The flow of government resources into the programme increased and the CDD approaches were adopted beyond the CBARDP areas. From the field visit, it was clear that state and local government council personnel were still working closely with the CDAs. Since CBARDP closure, new projects have emerged, and in some instances these projects are being coordinated by the CDA with the local government.
7. **Efficiency.** CBARDP suffered a significant delay before reaching effectiveness 17 months after the loan was signed. The programme continued to experience difficulties with the release of counterpart funds. The disbursement rate and volume accelerated dramatically from 2010, when the disbursement rules changed. However, the transaction costs for the decentralized fund management were relatively high and resulted in relatively high costs per beneficiary. Each state was consequently accounting for and submitting withdrawal applications individually. The number of applications was much higher than normal for IFAD and represented a high transaction cost for both IFAD and the Government.
8. **Impact.** Poverty impact remained highly localized, reaching less than 5 per cent of the total population in the seven states. Impact on incomes and assets has occurred only for a small number of beneficiaries. Overall, Government data for the northern states show that poverty has worsened despite the investments from Government and other development partners.
9. The CDAs as a fourth tier of government have been the most important impact delivered by CBARDP. This village-area form of community-based development architecture has been adopted widely across the programme area and has been sustained beyond the programme's duration. Testimonies received by the assessment team suggest that community organizations have shown a considerable level of resilience, even in conditions of insecurity and conflict.
10. **Sustainability.** The sustainability of a significant proportion of the assets, skills and credit systems supported under the programme remains good two years after programme closure. The asset verification exercise provided positive findings, with about 74 per cent of the sample (34 out of 46) rated as being in either reasonable or good working order and being successfully maintained by the relevant village committee. The highest ratings were found in Kebbi and Sokoto States. The lower-cost assets had better ratings. Often economic assets run by individuals (welding, sewing, threshing, milling, irrigation) were continued successfully and provided a significant increase in income to poorer beneficiaries.
11. **Gender.** Women were to be the main beneficiaries of the programme and they were targeted through the participatory approach. But the CDD approach has been less effective in transforming existing power relations and addressing issues of inequality within communities. The available evidence shows that women participated in high numbers in activities, but less in decision-making. Field visits found that the CDAs provided ground-breaking opportunities for many women involved, making them participants in activities for the first time. Nonetheless decision-making was reported to occur only in women's associations rather than at the CDA level itself. The high uptake of traditionally female interests and occupations (i.e. health and nutrition, sewing and knitting) and low uptake for female literacy classes indicate that in fact the programme may have reinforced existing roles and stereotypes. Furthermore, field visits found that little has changed in terms of women's workloads.
12. **Innovation.** The CDA counts as the most significant innovation delivered by the programme, in that it provided the structure and principles for how CDD would work at village level. The rules of operation (including election of officials and the hierarchy of the apex committee and sub-committees) and the authority invested

in these entities by virtue of their transparent democratic structure and because they were entrusted with dispensing programme funds have given them credibility. There is also evidence that the CDD approach has been scaled up more widely.

13. The significance and impact of CBARDP could have been better established if the **monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system** had provided a more solid evidence base to establish the effectiveness of the CDD approach. The overambitious design of the participatory M&E system was out of step with the capacities at community level. It was a missed opportunity that the participatory M&E, which would have been a major asset for the CDD programme, was never fully realized.
14. **Recommendations.** Below are some key recommendations for consideration by IFAD and the Government.
 - **Formalize the role of CDAs.** Under CBARDP, social inclusion, transparency and accountability have been enhanced. At the same time, CDAs maintain poor records, have limited accounting skills and there is limited reflow of assets. In the future, greater support for financial management as well as basic literacy and numeracy are needed. In future operations, such as the Climate Change Adaptation Programme, IFAD should focus on providing greater support for bringing about state legislation to provide a legal basis for CDAs to operate and be sustained.
 - **Provide appropriate guidance on participatory M&E and impact studies.** While routine monitoring and financial reporting have been largely satisfactory, much greater attention should be paid to: (i) proposing a more appropriate participatory approach to M&E at community level, so that it is aligned with local capacities and interests; and (ii) conducting more suitable evaluation surveys that consider the counterfactual, use sound data cleaning and verification, apply statistical tests to explore the meaningfulness of the data, and above all adopt a more objective approach to interpretation of the evidence. In addition, useful thematic studies need to be undertaken to provide insights on programme performance and emerging issues.
 - **Address power relations and social values through culturally appropriate gender strategies.** Important strides have been made in bringing greater equity to women in terms of sharing of development resources and being given greater opportunity to manage their own investments. Greater efforts are needed to bring women into decision-making structures such as CDAs, even though this is not straightforward in the more conservative Islamic culture found in northern Nigeria.
 - **Provide differentiated guidance on how to categorize beneficiaries and monitor benefits.** The IFAD Results and Impact Management System has encouraged a strong focus on counting different categories of beneficiaries. However greater attention needs to be given to how types of beneficiaries are defined and counted (to avoid double-counting, for example). Greater support also needs to be given to confine the number of top-down indicator and improve the analysis of who benefits (i.e. targeting).

IFAD Management's response¹

15. Management welcomes the project performance assessment (PPA) of the Community Based Agriculture and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP) of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. During the PPA fieldwork, structured evidence gathering tools were used including an evaluation framework to guide interviews and an asset verification form to collect evidence on the condition of visible assets. In addition, the PPA carried out individual interviews and group discussions with state officials, programme staff, village and group leaders and a range of beneficiaries in the programme area. Despite the limited amount of time, Management appreciates the analysis and the insights emanating from the PPA.
16. Management is in concurrence with the findings contained in the PPA. Management was pleased to note the positive assessment made by the PPA of CBARDP performance and its impact on communities in the poorest regions of Nigeria. The PPA identifies the fundamental role played by the community development associations (CDAs) in the implementation of the programme and recognizes their importance in changing poor peoples' lives. In this sense, CBARDP has provided important lessons to the Government of Nigeria. By enabling them to channel funding into hard-to-reach areas and populations, the Programme has made evident that the CDAs fill an institutional vacuum by acting as the fourth tier of government.
17. Testimonies received by the PPA suggest that community organizations have shown a considerable level of resilience, even in conditions of insecurity and conflict. This village area form of community-based development architecture has been adopted widely across the programme area and has been sustained beyond the programme duration. The CDAs have also established themselves as a structure and a space to plan community investments and manage them in a sustainable way. The asset verification exercise carried out in the framework of the PPA provided positive findings, with about 74 per cent of the sample rated as being in either reasonable or good working order and being successfully maintained by the relevant village committee.
18. Management recognises that the overambitious design of the participatory monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was never fully realised. It was a missed opportunity as a participatory system would have been a major asset for the programme, and provided a more solid evidence base to establish the effectiveness of CBARDP's community driven development (CDD) approach.
19. Management finds all the PPA recommendations relevant, and wishes to highlight the pertinence of three of them for the implementation of IFAD programmes in Nigeria:
 - (a) *Formalise the role of CDAs.* Management concurs with the recommendation that future programmes, e.g. the Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme in the Savannah Belt (CASP), should seek to focus on providing greater support for bringing about state legislation to provide a legal basis for CDAs to operate and be sustained. CASP will scale up the establishment of CDAs to more local governments in the programme states which CBARDP worked in.
 - (b) *Provide guidance on participatory M&E and impact studies.* Management agrees with the PPA findings that greater attention is to be paid to:
 - (i) proposing an appropriate participatory approach to M&E at community level, aligned with local capacities and interests; and
 - (ii) conducting

¹ The final Management response was sent from the Programme Management Department to the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD on 12 February 2016.

evaluation surveys that consider the counterfactual, use data cleaning and verification, apply statistical tests, and adopt a more systematic approach to interpretation of the evidence. Management will ensure that future programmes undertake appropriate thematic studies to provide insights on programme performance and emerging issues.

- (c) *Address power relations and social values through culturally appropriate gender strategies.* Management concurs with the PPA that strides have been made in bringing greater equity to women in terms of sharing of development resources and being given greater opportunity to manage their own investments. Management agrees with the PPA recommendation that future interventions bring women into decision-making structures such as CDAs.

Federal Republic of Nigeria

Community-Based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme

Project Performance Assessment

I. Objectives, methodology and process

1. **Background.** The Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) undertakes project performance assessments (PPAs) for a number of selected completed projects.¹ The Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP) in Nigeria was selected for a PPA to build IOE's project-level evaluative evidence for an upcoming country programme evaluation (CPE). IOE conducted a project completion report validation (PCR/V) for this programme in 2013 which: (a) highlighted the importance of CBARDP within the IFAD portfolio in Nigeria, both in financial terms and for advancing the community-driven development (CDD) approach; and (b) pointed to the lack of robust evidence, in particular on the sustainability of community institutions, which deserved further field-based investigation. The PPA provides an input into the Nigeria CPE, conducted in 2015.
2. **Objectives and focus.** The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results and impact of the CBARDP and generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in Nigeria.
3. **Methodology.** The PPA follows the IFAD Evaluation Policy² and IFAD/IOE Evaluation Manual (first edition) and the IOE Guidelines for PCR/V/PPA. It adopts a set of internationally recognized evaluation criteria and a six-point rating scale (annex I). During the PPA fieldwork, two structured evidence gathering tools were used: an evaluation framework (annex III) to guide interviews and an asset verification form (annex IV - table 1) to collect evidence on the condition of visible assets. The latter was the only form of empirical survey conducted and involved selected visits to 49 assets in 20 villages.³ As is usual in PPAs, due to time and resource constraints, a more detailed quantitative survey was not undertaken. Other data collection methods included individual interviews and group discussions with stakeholders in programme sites, including state officials, programme staff, village and group leaders and a range of beneficiaries. Other key informants were interviewed in Abuja, Kano and Rome.
4. **Data availability and limitations.** The programme has kept fair records on use of funds, activities and outputs. However, throughout the programme period, the quality of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data was poor. Because of security concerns, the PPA field mission was unable to visit the North East and so could not verify in any depth the influence of insurgency and violence on programme activities. The Yobe State Programme Officer (SPO) was thus interviewed in Abuja.
5. **Impact study.** Assessing impact for CBARDP presented a number of challenges from both a methodology and a data point of view. Ideally, to determine the real impact of CBARDP, one would aim to compare outcomes in villages supported by the programme against outcomes in nearby non-CBARDP villages. If this was not possible, then a comparison between local government areas (LGAs) supported by CBARDP and LGAs not supported would have provided a less effective but still

¹ The selection criteria for PPA include: (i) synergies with forthcoming or ongoing IOE evaluations (e.g. country programme evaluations); (ii) novel approaches; (iii) major information gaps in programme completion reports (PCRs); and (iv) geographic balance.

² <http://www.ifad/pub/policy/oe.pdf>

³ These were in 13 LGAs located across 4 of the 7 CBARDP states (Kebbi, Jigawa, Katsina and Sokoto).

reasonable basis for comparison.⁴ Baseline, mid-term and impact surveys were done, but having carefully examined these reports and spoken to those involved⁵ there are a number of flaws which lead to doubts over the validity of the data. Nevertheless, the PPA has attempted to do some comparisons between baseline and impact results, where common variables exist.⁶

6. **Government statistics.** A difficulty encountered in analytically comparing programme performance across the different states in the PPA was the lack of state-level and year-on-year Government statistics. The latest annual National Bureau of Statistics datasets are from 2012, and exploratory analyses of these revealed wide fluctuations in year-on-year indicators including unemployment, absolute poverty, and adult literacy. The absence of any causal explanations for such fluctuations did not reflect an accurate picture of the situation on the ground and therefore they could not be used as sources for a comparative analysis of socioeconomic changes.
7. **Process.** The PPA mission⁷ was undertaken from June to July 2015. A preparation visit took place in Abuja from 22 to 25 June. Fieldwork was then undertaken in Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa States from 2 to 15 July and Kebbi State from 22 to 23 July. The team met with former CBARDP programme staff, community members and beneficiaries and assessed 44 different types of programme asset. The wrap up meeting was held in Abuja on 28 July.
8. Following the mission, further analysis of the data and findings was conducted. The resulting draft report was then peer reviewed within IOE. It was thereafter shared with IFAD's West and Central Africa Division and the Government of Nigeria, and their comments have been taken into account in the final report.

II. The programme

A. The programme context

9. **Programme environment.** The CBARDP was designed against the backdrop of the Government's Rural Development Strategy (2001) which adopted a participatory approach as a core principle to address community needs and capacity, to transfer resources to local communities, to promote policy dialogue and decentralization, and to introduce sector reforms aiming at empowerment of rural communities, and gender equity. Between 2003 and 2007, the Government introduced its own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper - the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS) programme. Agriculture, food security and economic growth were given priority, and enacted through the complementary State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) and the Local Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS). In terms of strategies, SEEDS and LEEDS focused on smallholder farmers, agricultural extension, inputs, and irrigation.
10. This was followed by the 2011-2015 Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) which was focussed on growth. The ATA strives to "achieve a hunger-free Nigeria through an agricultural sector that drives income growth, accelerates achievement of food and nutritional security, generates employment, and transforms Nigeria into a leading player in global food markets". The goals of the ATA are to increase

⁴ The Impact study team argued that IFAD evaluation guidance advised against use of counterfactuals largely on ethical grounds. But in this situation, it would have been quite feasible to include a without-project sample from a set of non-CBARDP village areas at baseline, mid-term and impact without any ethical dilemmas.

⁵ These include members of the impact study team, State Support Office (SSO) staff, the data analyst for the impact study and the IFAD country team involved.

⁶ Comparisons have been problematic because of differences in the definition used and questions asked in the two surveys.

⁷ The mission consisted of Johanna Pennarz (Lead Evaluator IOE), Nick Chapman (senior consultant), Ifeyinwa Achike (economist), Hauwa El Yakub (sociologist).

demand for Nigeria's staple food crops by 20 million metric tons and create 3.5 million jobs in agriculture by 2015.

11. The CBARDP was originally designed to operate in eight of the northernmost states in Nigeria, covering 286,500km² and an estimated 29 million people in 2000.⁸ Two thirds of the people live in rural areas, within either the Sahel Savannah or Sudan Savannah agro-ecozones, where rainfall is less than 1000mm per year. As rainfall decreases northwards, population and farming intensity decreases, and the main crops are millet and sorghum along with livestock rearing. Soils tend to be poor, except for low-lying river basins and '**fadama**' wetlands, where rice and irrigated vegetables are grown.
12. The northern states in Nigeria have consistently shown the worst national poverty measures. At the time of appraisal, life expectancy at birth was 50 years and two thirds of people were living below a dollar a day.⁹ The level of poverty has not changed over the past decade, and in some states has worsened. An important re-assessment study by World Bank in 2014 showed that while poverty was improving in the South, it was worsening in the North West and North East and that these two zones together account for the majority (52 per cent) of poor Nigerians. Adding also the North Central zone, it appears that about 66 per cent of the poor reside in the northern part of the country.¹⁰ In addition, the northern states have the highest unemployment rates (29-45 per cent) and the lowest school enrolment (30-40 per cent).¹¹
13. Gender discrimination in northern Nigeria is deep-seated and tied to social and religious practices that limit women's access to education, health and economic opportunities. Traditional roles sharply distinguish the activities that men and women can assume in both social and economic spheres. The incidence of poverty in women-headed households is higher than average, and women rarely occupy leadership positions in community bodies, emirate councils or government.¹²
14. **Programme approach.** CBARDP was designed as a follow-up programme to the previous IFAD-funded Katsina State Agricultural and Community Development Programme (KSACDP) and the Sokoto State Agricultural and Community Development Programme (SSACDP). These programmes ran from 1994/95 until 2001 and included support for natural resource management, agriculture and village infrastructure. An impact assessment in 2000 confirmed the successful delivery of benefits, particularly in terms of raising awareness about the importance of empowerment and community involvement in development activities, reduced environmental degradation, improved village infrastructure such as roads, water and sanitation, and the greater involvement of local government.
15. The **programme goal** was "to improve the livelihoods and living conditions of poor rural communities, with emphasis on women and other vulnerable groups in the seven states participating in the programme". The **programme objectives** were to: (a) Empower poor rural women and men to critically analyze their constraints, opportunities and support requirements and to effectively manage their own development agenda; (b) Support institutionalization of the programme policies and processes, create awareness and develop the capacity of public and private sector service providers to become more relevant and responsive to the needs of the rural poor women and men; and (c) Support balanced sustainable social, agricultural and economic development interventions for appropriate village groups and individuals. These goals and objectives were consistently stated across the

⁸ CBARDP Formulation Report, 2001, p. 3.

⁹ CBARDP Appraisal Report, Working Paper 1, p.16.

¹⁰ Nigeria Economic Report, World Bank. July 2014, p.18.

¹¹ Statistical Abstract, National Bureau of Statistics, 2012.

¹² KSACDP and SSACDP attempted to increase women's representations on councils but failed. (Appraisal Report, WP 1, p. 7).

appraisal and President's Report. The PPA has prepared a Theory of Change to capture the intervention logic (annex XIV).

16. **Programme components.** CBARDP had 2 components:
 - a. **Awareness and capacity-building**, which included sensitization and setting up of groups and CDAs at community level, strengthening local government staff to support CDD, and strengthening state and federal-level staff to manage, support and monitor and evaluate the programme.
 - b. **Community development fund**, which supported four groups of interventions: support to vulnerable groups; sustainable agricultural development; rural enterprise development and financial linkage support (rural enterprises development and financial linkage support); and community infrastructure.
17. **Programme financing.** The planned total cost was US\$68.5 million, including an IFAD loan of US\$29.9 million and grant funding of US\$3.0 million for technical assistance, a Government contribution of US\$31.5 million¹³ and beneficiary contribution of US\$4 million. Unlike previous IFAD projects, where IFAD met up to 90 per cent of incremental costs, the approach under CBARDP was for IFAD to provide 50 per cent of funding for all categories of expenditure with the balance to come from Government and beneficiaries. At local level, an investment ceiling of US\$200,000 per village area was set, exclusive of the community's own contribution.
18. **Implementation arrangements.** The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was responsible for overall coordination and implementation, while the Federal Ministry of Finance would oversee loan disbursements and recovery and the National Planning Commission would support monitoring and evaluation. A Programme Support Office (PSO) would oversee programme delivery across the eight states, while at state-level an Agricultural and Rural Development Executive Committee chaired by the State Governor would have autonomy to implement the programme within guidelines and conditionalities set by separate state-level loan agreements. A State Support Office (SSO) would coordinate local government actors. At local government-level a Local Government Development Committee (LGDC) would review and support village area plans with the help of a Local Government Technical Support Team (LGTST).
19. **Phasing:** The programme was to be phased so that awareness raising would take place initially at local government level and then within the selected village areas for the first two years. This would then be followed by an investment phase at community-level based on locally-developed and owned Community Action Plans. In each state, the number of participating LGAs would rise by six per year over a three-year period. A reduction in expenditure on infrastructure over time was also planned, declining from 50 per cent of community investment in the first year of involvement to 20 per cent in year four. This was to ensure a minimum spend on capacity development, set at 33 per cent of the total village area allocation. The final three years of the CBARDP were financed under a subsidiary agreement to the loan, with the aim being to reinforce existing investments and to strengthen government institutions within the same participating states, LGAs and village areas.
20. **Changes in the programme context and loan amendments.** The most important changes related to: (i) the IFAD CPE in 2009 that heralded a move by IFAD from broad community development towards a focus on agriculture and market linkages; and (ii) disappointing loan disbursement levels over the first seven years. These two factors led to an extension of programme completion from

¹³ Divided into Federal Government (US\$2.9 million), State Government (US\$5.2 million) and Local Government (US\$23.4 million).

2010 to 2013 with US\$16.9 million of additional funds, with IFAD providing US\$13 million. The rationale for this increase was to provide for further completion of and consolidate investments to date, provide complementary support to stand alone infrastructure already provided and to expand agricultural support in line with the move to value chain approaches.¹⁴ Disbursement and procurement rules were adjusted so that IFAD funds could cover 100 per cent of incremental expenditures.¹⁵

21. Rising insecurity in Nigeria, particularly in the North East zone (Borno and Yobe in particular) also affected the ability of the programme to sustain and expand delivery in the last three years. The growth of the Boko Haram movement from 2009¹⁶ has led to over 13,000 reported deaths and 1 million displaced persons mainly in the North East.¹⁷
22. A further key change in the CBARDP context is declining oil revenue as a percentage of Nigerian GDP since 2010, countered by the emergence of a more robust agriculture sector. Reduced oil revenues have affected federal disbursements to states, and so tightened the ability of state and LGAs to sustain CBARDP programme activities. Yet, agriculture under the ATA has shown reasonable growth at 4.9 per cent.
23. **Changes in targets.** No changes were planned under the loan amendment to the target groups. Two components were defined however: (i) Community driven development and (ii) Institutional streamlining and capacity building. Under the first component, 407 primary schools, 316 health centres, 1,367 water points and 1,208km of rural roads were to be improved, though many of these were existing infrastructures that were to be given supplementary support. Under the second component, the emphasis was on increasing efficiency and building planning and M&E capacity.¹⁸ The objectives were similar to the original design, and the new components were merged within the existing programme. Since Operations and Maintenance Committees had been established within the CDAs, more emphasis was placed on building their capacity managing the assets delivered, and to streamline local government coordination. An updated logframe is not available but the Annual Work Programme and Budget (AWPB) and the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) were updated to reflect the new targets.¹⁹

B. Programme implementation

24. Following loan signing in December 2001, the IFAD loan was declared effective on 31 January 2003. CBARDP was originally due for completion in March 2010, but with a three year extension, the final closing date was 31 March 2013.

¹⁴ PCR, p.1 and PC Digest, comments under Efficiency.

¹⁵ PCR, appendix 3.

¹⁶ Several commentaries link the start of Boko Haram (meaning Western education is forbidden) to the assassination of the founding leader Muhammed Yussuf in July 2009 in police custody, and the rise of his more violent replacement, Abubakar Shekau see Simeon Alozieuwa, *Contending Theories on Nigeria's Security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency*, Peace & Conflict Review, Volume 7, Issue 1, 2012.

¹⁷ Africa Check.org and International Office of Migration (20/1/15).

¹⁸ COSOP 2010, appendix VI.

¹⁹ For example the AWPB 2011 reflects the agreed activities, although it still refers to the original components.

Table 1
Actual costs and financing (US\$ '000)

Categories	IFAD	Government (Federal, states and local government councils)	Total allocation (IFAD and Government)	Actual utilization of the total allocation (IFAD and Government)	% (Actual total utilization/total allocation)
A. Community Development Fund					
A1. CDF village infrastructure	13.94	13.95	27.89	33.87	121.4%
A2. CDF village services	9.30	7.98	17.28	22.82	132.0%
Sub total	23.24	21.58	45.17	56.69	125.5%
B. Awareness and capacity-building					
B1. Consultancies, studies, audit and training	6.26	6.90	13.16	14.14	107.4%
C1. Vehicles and equipment	5.60	4.49	10.09	10.81	107.1%
D. Salaries, allowances and operations and maintenance	7.15	6.92	14.07	15.11	107.4%
Sub total	19.01	18.31	37.32	40.06	107.3%
Grand total	42.25	39.89	82.49	96.75	117.3%
Percentage draw down	98.5%	103.0%	97.0%	117.3%	

Source: Project completion report.


25. CBARDP, in common with other IFAD programmes in Nigeria, faced difficulties between loan signing and effectiveness. These related to opening of accounts, appointing programme staff and release of Government counterpart funds.²⁰ Apart from delays at federal level, some states were also unable to meet some of their own effectiveness conditions.²¹
26. Subsequently, the CPE, based on fieldwork conducted in 2007, indicated that CBARDP was performing well despite slow disbursement. It was nevertheless guided by the overall CPE thrust that it should move to a greater focus on agricultural value chains, while completing the infrastructure projects already started. This direction was reinforced by the 2010 country strategic opportunities programme (COSOP) and in the loan extension signed in 2010. The change in approach introduced in 2010 rapidly increased disbursements (figure 1).
27. From 2009, when loan disbursements were just 59 per cent of the original loan, by 2013 CBARDP had disbursed 99 per cent.²² Moreover, state governments exceeded their targets and released 103 per cent of planned expenditure.

²⁰ An amount of N119 million from the Federal Government was outstanding as late as May 2003 according to the supervision mission of May 2003.

²¹ Borno, Jigawa, Katsina and Kebbi had to meet various conditions concerning accounts, formation of committees and appointment of auditors. Supervision mission, December 2003.

²² PCR, appendix 4, table C.

Figure 1
IFAD-CBARDP comparison of targeted (design and AWPB) and actual loan disbursement rates (2003-2013)*



Source: CBARDP Appraisal Report Vol. I, Appendix 7 - Projections of Loan Disbursement; IFAD Flexcube data (2 November 2015); CBARDP AWPB data from 2010-2013; Naira-US\$ exchange rates from <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/currency>.

* AWPB targets from 2003-2009 have assumed USD-NGN exchange rates included, which were used to project IFAD loan disbursement for that year. 2010-2013 figures used USD-NGN exchange rates on the 31 December on the year previous to the stated AWPB to calculate projected loan disbursement targets for the following year (i.e. 31 December 2009 rate for AWPB 2010).

28. **Component 1: Awareness and capacity-building.** CBARDP supported a very wide range of training and capacity building covering beneficiaries, government staff and service providers. According to the project completion report (PCR), capacity-building outputs and targets for virtually all categories significantly exceeded their targets. However, the origin of these 'targets' is not clear.²³ Some 3,475 training and awareness-raising events are recorded over the 10 years of the programme, against a target of 2,975.²⁴ Of this number, 509 were for classified as community training, accounting for 13 per cent of the cost of this component, while the others were for workshops and conferences (25 per cent of the cost), in-house training (31 per cent), study tours (7 per cent), as well as media campaigns, reviews and linkages.
29. Training provided under the various sub-components, according to the impact survey, had a significant outreach, reaching between 20 per cent and 56 per cent of the respondents in sample communities.

²³ The CBARDP design documents do not contain any targets. Nevertheless, the various progress reports, supervision missions, RIMS and the impact study all refer to 'appraisal targets'. Our assumption must be that these were drawn up in some other document or from Annual Work Programme and Budgets.

²⁴ PCR, appendix 5.

Table 2

Number of respondents trained in sampled communities (impact survey)

<i>Sub- component of training</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>%</i>
Gender and vulnerable group support and development	742	44
Awareness and capacity-building	749	45
Rural community development	555	33
Sustainable development	942	56
Community infrastructural development	332	20
Rural enterprise development	527	31
Monitory and evaluation	145	9
Total	3 992	

N = 2,399 (The total percentage may add above 100 per cent because of multiple responses).

30. The component also sought to use and strengthen existing government structures to manage the programme. The PSO was to coordinate the programme, ensuring sound financial management, M&E and supervision. With such an extensive geographical scope, covering all of northern Nigeria, this was a logistical challenge. Furthermore, accountability arrangements were such that on administrative matters each SSO was accountable directly to the State Governor rather than the PSO,²⁵ while on technical matters the SSO reported to the PSO, with the responsible government officials in the loop.
31. **Component 2: Community development fund (CDF).** This component comprised the main investment activities and constituted 55 per cent of total costs at appraisal. With the loan extension, and the increasing agricultural activities, the final actual proportion of expenditure under the CDF reached 59 per cent of total costs. The Fund supported a wide array of activities both in terms of its range and in numbers. Packaged in four discrete groups, the programme covered a total of 28,116 investments across 42 different categories according to the PCR. These covered community infrastructure, sustainable agricultural development, rural enterprise and financial linkages support and gender and vulnerable group development. In almost all cases the numbers of such investments achieved exceeded targets substantially,²⁶ but this is explained by the additional funds and activities carried out in the loan extension period. If one examines the achievements against targets in 2010, the level of achievement is much more mixed. At this stage, agricultural and economic investments generally fell below the appraisal targets (irrigation, fish ponds, rainwater harvesting, resource management, financial savings, roads), while social investments were mostly above appraisal targets (schools, water, community groups).²⁷
32. **The CDD approach** supported by CBARDP was based on five principles: (i) community empowerment; (ii) local government empowerment; (iii) realigning the centre in order to build a balanced approach between community and government, (iv) downward accountability and transparency; and (v) learning by doing. The intention was to fill the gap in local government by building a '4th tier' at village level. CDAs are formed from elected representatives from across the village area for a two year period, and through their various sub-committees, take responsibility for planning, implementing and maintaining village level investments. Each CDA is an apex of primary groups within the community and it performs five

²⁵ Within each state, accountability linkages were better for example between state and LG offices, though there were gaps in terms of links with State Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs) in some cases (Zamfara and Sokoto).

²⁶ Although the origin of these targets as noted already is unclear.

²⁷ RIMS report 2010.

functions: (i) project identification, monitoring and supervision; (ii) entry point for other development partners and government agencies into the communities; (iii) linking commodity groups to services including credit and market services; (iv) knowledge sharing about innovations among community members; and (v) security and conflict resolution. The CDA organised the community contribution (set at 10 per cent) towards the cost of CBARDP, and also organised training of community artisans to operate and maintain various facilities such as water pumps and boreholes.

33. The **sequencing of activities** moving from awareness-raising and capacity building to eventually funding investments that were selected by the community was very relevant – it built on previous experience in past IFAD projects, and recognised that CDD approaches were new to both the communities and the service providers and would need time to be understood. The expectation that the awareness and capacity-building component would require three years to undertake might have been regarded as realistic at the time, given the focus on a limited number of village areas. In fact this timeframe proved insufficient because of the vast scale of the area covered and the unfamiliarity of the approach to both communities and Government, and the need for a more extensive period of awareness-raising and capacity building might have been better recognized.
34. The majority of empowerment work under the awareness and capacity-building component occurred in the first three years of the programme when awareness-raising of communities took place through a range of meetings and media activities. The CDAs were supported by LGA staff who formed community-driven development teams. The mid-term review (MTR) stated that this process had been universally achieved, though it also commented that the community-level training needed to continue both for the communities themselves and for the staff and service providers in order to deepen the process and build genuine ownership.²⁸ It became evident at mid-term that continuing community mobilization and capacity building was needed (MTR, p. 4). The MTR also called for further emphasis on understanding gender issues and on staff and villagers having a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Even through to the extension phase, there were continuing efforts to support the community groups because of perceived weaknesses in their management skills and ability to continue to plan and instigate development activities.
35. **Carte blanche approach:** With a CDD approach it is for the community to decide what development investments are needed, and the service providers whether public or private to respond. But the inevitably wide range of interventions that resulted presented immense technical challenges for all parties to design, build and operate. This approach was altered in the loan extension phase with greater emphasis on economic assets, although even then the justification for the extension also included continued strengthening of community ownership and completion of already started community infrastructure.²⁹ It might therefore have been wiser to narrow the choice of investments to match capacities to implement.
36. **Monitoring and valuation.** An elaborate architecture was put in place with suitable M&E staff recruited and trained. At mid-term, the system was found to be in good order with qualified staff and sufficient equipment. In practice, however, the involvement by beneficiaries was found to be limited, and operation of the system has been top down in terms of the data tools, choice of indicators and

²⁸ Mid Term Review, 2007, p. 22.

²⁹ As an interesting counter to the broad but balanced approach to investment choice made by CBARDP, the World Bank's parallel Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CBPRP) was criticised in its Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) for focusing on only social investments and not including economic micro-projects in its scope – it was argued that with this exclusion communities would not eventually generate the means to pay for the maintenance of the social assets.

reporting formats. The IFAD's RIMS system was adopted and drove M&E data collection in a way that reinforced a top-down, rather rigid indicator-driven approach. The strain on implementing this system was evident as the number of monitoring visits was below target (52 per cent). Changes in M&E personnel, lack of qualified staff at local level, and weak community understanding of how to do participatory M&E, have all meant that, as noted by supervisions and the PCR, the M&E function was limited to measuring achievements of activities against targets. Any deeper analysis of performance results was missing, and thematic studies that could have provided richer insights, though budgeted for, were not undertaken.³⁰

37. The **indicators** defined in both the Appraisal Report logframe (repeated here in annex V) and repeated in the President's Report have not been fully followed in the subsequent CBARDP M&E system, Results and Impact Management System (RIMS), MTR, impact study or PCR. This is especially so for the most critical indicators at outcome level. nine indicators were defined, each of which sets important aims in terms of involvement of women in decision-making roles at both community-level and in local government, government resource flows reaching the poor, satisfaction levels of communities with local government and service providers and changes in literacy rates. These indicators are well-articulated to capture how well the CBARDP approaches have been embedded and may be sustained. Yet unfortunately, none of these indicators have been properly measured at any stage in the programme's life, and thus the ability of an evaluation to judge success is severely impaired.
38. The **participatory M&E design** was prepared in rich detail at formulation and appraisal. The approach described is sound enough and the obligations of each state and community are explained in detail. The programme implementation manual planned to use CDDTs and Community-based Advisory Teams to identify a small section of beneficiaries in the villages for which case studies would be prepared and then updated over the life of activities to quantify and highlight changes occurring in the villages due to the programme interventions. This was not done. Supervision missions repeatedly raised the issue of poor M&E reports and weak community implementation of participatory M&E practices. It appears that the M&E design was therefore too ambitious or else culturally inappropriate for the community setting. In other words, are the targeted communities likely to have the required capacity to conduct regular monitoring, keep detailed records and carry out evaluations in the form prescribed by the programme? CDAs were not good at maintaining records and keeping track of reflow of funds. Limited success occurred in conducting participatory M&E, as noted by various supervision missions and the PPA field visit. The MTR noted that while community structures are in place for communities to monitor their projects, the extent of involvement is low. Moreover, the selection of indicators was top down, deriving from RIMS and the state AWPBs, so that the beneficiaries were not involved (MTR, p. 7). In addition, there was insufficient technical support and training to help with establishing a practical system at the start of implementation.³¹

³⁰ A very similar experience was noted in the PPAR of the World Bank CBPRP: "It is an example of a project that was likely more successful than the M&E data can possibly tell. Key indicators were regularly collected and used by state agencies to carry out desk and field assessments of proposals, as well as the selection and funding of micro-projects, and to monitor the realization of the community infrastructure. But very little was collected on targeting, the participatory process, and impacts on the well-being of the communities" (PPAR, p. xi).

³¹ There was training by the West African Rural Foundation (WARF) on participatory M&E but only for programme staff. It was delivered too late (in 2009) and from the report of the training involved no practical experience.

Key points

- CBARDP was designed in a northern Nigerian context of the highest poverty in the country, and covered a huge geographical area.
- It was a follow up to KSACDP and SSACDP, spreading to seven states, and built on several of the lessons from IFAD's experience in these two operations.
- The programme's goal and objectives were well articulated and consistently stated; however the high quality logframe indicators in the Appraisal were not adopted or tracked in the programme M&E system or subsequent reviews or studies.
- The programme had an initial budget of US\$68.5 million but a three-year loan extension in 2010 increased funds by US\$16.9 million.
- CBARDP suffered delayed effectiveness and slow disbursement due to late counterpart funding and the withdrawal of Kano State from the programme. With adjusted loan conditions allowing IFAD to disburse without matching counterpart funds, eventual expenditure reached 99 per cent of the loan allocation.
- A detailed participatory M&E design was provided, and although staff and tools were put in place, the system has been top down and only able to track RIMS indicators.
- The awareness and capacity-building component delivered awareness raising and empowerment to 207 communities, and 65 local governments, less than at design due to withdrawal of Kano State.
- 28,116 CDF investments were delivered across 42 categories, and targets were mostly exceeded (although the origin of these targets remains obscure). Despite this achievement, the number of direct beneficiaries were 1.2 million or around half of the original target, although the basis for this figure is unclear (see para 67).

III. Review of findings

A. Programme performance

Relevance of objectives

39. The logframe contained in the design document (2001) has a goal, purpose and three outputs that explain well the logic of the programme, from providing process interventions (capacity building of communities and government and other actors) and investment (agriculture, enterprises, infrastructure and services to vulnerable groups) that put together will deliver better services and empowered communities that in turn will raise productivity and incomes. The CBARDP design documents³² do not contain any targets, which is understandable given the CDD nature of the programme. Although 234 villages are targeted,³³ the detailed targets were to arise from community plans.
40. The **first programme objective** to 'empower the poor rural women and men to critically analyze their constraints, opportunities and support requirements and to effectively manage their own development agenda' was very relevant given the emerging priority given to CDD approaches (see para 43). The **second objective** to 'support institutionalization of the programme policies and processes, create awareness and develop the capacity of public and private sector service providers to become more relevant and responsive to the needs of the rural poor women and men' also matched Government and IFAD policy well at the time (see para 41, 44, 45). The **third objective** to 'support balanced sustainable social, agricultural and economic development interventions for appropriate village groups and individuals' was a very broad statement that allowed a wide range of interventions that was rather ambitious given the implementation capacity of Government and communities.
41. **Policy relevance.** CBARDP's goal of 'improving the livelihoods and living conditions of rural communities, with emphasis on women and other vulnerable groups' converged with the overarching objectives both of IFAD and the Government.³⁴ From the Government side, the NEEDS was the leading policy vision in the early 2000s.³⁵ One of the three major objectives of NEEDS is empowering people and improving social services delivery.³⁶
42. At the time of design, Nigeria was facing a challenging political and economic situation. After 30 years of military rule, a new democratic government was wrestling with a failed structural adjustment programme that had not alleviated poverty or inequality. Rural poverty remained deep and persistent while agriculture was the major employer and source of livelihood for the majority of the poor. New approaches were being sought to resolve this seemingly intransigent problem. The Government's new policy solution emphasised empowerment, private sector-led growth and reforms to Government service delivery.

³² Formulation Report, Appraisal Report, Presidents Report and Programme implementation manuals.

³³ After Kano withdrew, 207 villages were targeted.

³⁴ Other partners too were embarking on similar broad-based community-led programmes. The AfDB agreed to finance a duplicate of CBARDP in 5 other states from 2003-09 (Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, Niger and Kaduna, while the World Bank emphasised a similar approach in its very first community-based operation in Nigeria, the Community Based Poverty Reduction Project (CBPRP) 2000-09 (and which overlapped in Kebbi and Yobe).

³⁵ As enshrined in Part Three, Chapter Six (Sectoral Strategies) of NEEDS (2003 – 2007), the NEEDS policy thrusts for Nigeria's agriculture and food security are: (i) to modernize agriculture and create an agricultural sector that was responsive to the demands and realities of the Nigerian economy in order to create more agricultural and rural employment opportunities which will increase incomes; (ii) strive towards food security and a food surplus that could be exported; and (iii) invest in improving the quality of the environment in order to increase crop yields.

³⁶ At the state and local government levels, NEEDS was adapted to subnational versions (2004-2007) known respectively as State Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (SEEDS) and Local Economic and Empowerment Development Strategy (LEEDS). Their policy thrust was economic growth through participation, empowerment, wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction. In terms of strategies, SEEDS and LEEDS focused on smallholder farmers, agricultural extension, inputs and irrigation.

43. Community driven approaches had already emerged in 1996 from the Community Action Programme for Poverty Alleviation" (CAPPA), prepared by the National Planning Commission. Subsequently, the Rural Development Strategy (RDS), formulated in 2001, was based on core principles of a participatory approach to reflect community needs and the building of capacity at community and local government level, transferring resources to communities, support for decentralization, and greater equity amongst groups and by gender.³⁷ Equally, the Economic Policy (1999-2003) stressed poverty reduction, agriculture and addressing corruption as major themes, as well as deepening democracy through the devolution of power to states, local governments and community organizations.
44. **Alignment.** Besides policy relevance, CBARDP was well-aligned with local government responsibilities and funding.³⁸ There was generally good buy-in from the participating seven states. Kano State's withdrawal indicated more a lack of willingness from the Governor in place at the time to take on a loan than it did in the principles of CDD.³⁹ However the design decision to require Government to fund most categories to a level of 50 per cent before IFAD would release its contribution, though understandable given the past problems with counterpart funding, was not sound.
45. IFAD's 2001 COSOP captured these ideas and set the framework for programmes that would deliver a range of community-chosen and implemented investments encompassing capacity building as well as broad-based infrastructure covering health, education, water, agricultural and other activities. The CBARDP objectives formulated in 2001 were therefore very well aligned to these Government approaches towards rural development. CBARDP's emphasis on strengthening local actors down to village level and enabling communities to determine their own development and to manage their own funds was closely aligned with this policy framework. It also aligned well with the COSOP's emphasis on strengthening rural institutions, supporting pro-poor reforms in local governance, generating sustainable incomes from community organizations both on and off-farm, and lastly seeking more equitable distribution of benefits amongst men and women. While CBARDP's design did address the needs of the poor by permitting remote communities to define their needs and receive assistance to then meet them, the initial design process itself was not very participatory, even though the early years of implementation gave space for substantial participation as communities were sensitized to plan their development.
46. The aim of addressing the growing imbalance between the northern and southern states in terms of poverty measures fitted well with an expansion of focus across the northernmost states. The signals from the two ACDPs that state governments were ready to adopt CDD approaches gave a promise that expansion of this modality to other states would be possible.
47. Finally, CBARDP, as one of the first multi-state programmes applying CDD methods, was seen as significant (though not ground-breaking given that it already was a scaling up of prior CDD projects) in demonstrating how such an approach could be rolled out in a substantial manner, and led to its replication by other actors.⁴⁰ According to the IFAD Country Office, development partners active in the same locations used the CDA approach to implement their intervention, thus limiting

³⁷ CBARDP Appraisal Report, p. 5.

³⁸ The three tiers of government (Federal, State and Local) are interdependent on each other for service delivery. In particular, Section 55 of part 11 of Local Government Law (2004) has empowered Local Governments to provide services in several areas covering primary health, basic education, agricultural extension, local roads, housing and welfare.

³⁹ The supervision mission in February 2006 indicated that Kano State wished to adopt the programme approach but using its own resources.

⁴⁰ The World Bank had also initiated their CBPRP (2001-2009) approved in 2000 and effective in 2001 and this was claimed to be 'the first large-scale project implemented by communities' (PPAR, p. 6).

duplication of efforts and supporting harmonization at the local level. The African Development Bank (AfDB) followed the model almost exactly in five other states; IFAD's next lending operation, the Community-Based Natural Resource Management Programme – Niger Delta (CBNMRP), approved in 2002, also followed CDD approaches, though with some modifications to suit the environment.

Relevance of design

48. **Programme area and target groups.** The North East and North West of Nigeria where the CBARDP was located had the highest poverty incidences in 2004, 71.2 per cent and 71.2 per cent respectively. The household baseline survey conducted in 2004 by CBARDP showed the following socioeconomic characteristics of people in the CBARDP sites: (i) farming was their main occupation; (ii) high illiteracy and poverty levels; (iii) lack of access to cheaper formal credit; (iv) absence of modern health facilities and rural infrastructures; (v) food insecure with largely subsistence production systems, the majority having less than a hectare of farm holdings; (vi) and low income and output from production.
49. The CBARDP design laid out careful criteria for how the selection of the target local governments was to be done.⁴¹ The intention was to select the poorest LGAs, and within those the poorest village areas would be ranked and prioritised. Given the absence of reliable statistics for some of the targeting indicators, the programme design stipulated that participatory methods should be used to facilitate intra-community targeting. Seven of the new states were to receive an equal level of assistance (nine LGAs and three village areas per LGA), while Katsina and Sokoto, because of their previous involvement in the IFAD-funded KSACDP and SSACDP were to have a larger level of assistance, with 12 LGAs and 3 village areas per LGA. The total target was 78 LGAs across eight states covering 234 village areas.⁴² In practice, the choice of participating LGAs or village areas was also influenced by political factors, such as heaving equitable spread across senatorial districts.
50. The design of CBARDP also reflected the trajectory of those earlier programmes in terms of their area-based CDD approach. The lessons from KSACDP and SSACDP were fairly well followed, as illustrated in table 3. The main gaps in following lessons were around the extremely broad spread of the programme and the limited attention to natural resource management. CBARDP was thinly spread across all eight states of northern Nigeria (reducing to seven states as Kano withdrew) and distances between programme areas were considerable, making coordination and supervision difficult. This was compensated for to some extent by the clustering of investments in a small number of village areas in order to achieve maximum impact, and in the expectation that the CDD approach would then be replicated.
51. CBARDP also did not strongly address natural resource management. While soil degradation and use of sustainable agriculture techniques such as organic fertilizer and agro-forestry were themes, these were not expected to form major components. This was a significant gap given the failure to address these experiences in past programmes, and the strong links between the poorest rural farmers and soil degradation in marginal environments.

⁴¹ CBARDP Appraisal Report, Working Paper 1, p. 23.

⁴² Although part of the design at appraisal, Kano State withdrew from the programme before loan effectiveness.

Table 3

Selected design lessons from KSACDP and SSACDP and CBARDP's response

<i>Lessons</i>	<i>CBARDP response</i>
<i>Community development</i>	
~ Building grassroots institutions requires long-term commitment.	CBARDP planned for a 7-year life, with the first 3 years devoted to sensitization and capacity building.
~ The number of beneficiaries reached was small relative to the rural population and had limited impact on poverty as a whole in the two states.	CBARDP did not aim to cover a sufficient level of beneficiaries to have a significant poverty effect at state-level, because it aimed to focus in clusters (village area) and have the approach extended by others.
~ Greater attention to including the poor and marginalised is needed. Insufficient attention to gender analysis/mainstreaming leads to marginalization.	CBARDP did focus on the poorest through its selection criteria for LGAs and village area. This was not fully successful as some locations were chosen as a result of political interference.
<i>Natural resource management</i>	
~ The area covered by programme activities was a small percentage of the total area affected by land degradation.	CBARDP was spread very thinly across the seven states, and land degradation was not a major criteria used for village areas selection.
~ Little attention was paid to addressing declining soil fertility with appropriate technologies such as use of crop residues, nitrogen fixing crops and planting trees.	CBARDP did not strongly address the issue of soil fertility: the preference from communities was for health, education and roads followed by economic investments, with environmental choices coming lower.
<i>Institutional performance</i>	
~ Establishment of enclave project management units with parallel implementation arrangements and high dependence on external financing is not sustainable.	CBARDP did work within existing government structures at LGA level, but at state level the use of Agricultural Development Programmes (ADPs).ADPs retained elements of the enclave project management approach, while the PSO operated as a separate 'national' project office. As such the PSO had limited influence over state authorities.
~ Financial management, supervision and technical guidance of field staff were poor. Inefficient management led to delayed procurement.	Regular and substantial supervision missions were a feature of CBARDP. But SSO and LGA staff were sound in some areas but not always sufficiently strong in other technical areas (such as farmer field schools, M&E).
~ Poor credit recovery affects sustainability. Promotion of savings culture in groups and better feasibility analysis of enterprises are needed.	Mixed results for CBARDP. Financial service associations (FSAs) reported to have fairly good recovery rates, but group savings in general do not seem to be a widespread success. There is limited evidence of feasibility analysis but there were few large scale economic investments where this might be justified.
~ Supervision missions gave priority to financial issues, and gave less guidance on participatory approaches and capacity building.	Supervision missions were well resourced with multi-disciplinary teams that offered wide management, financial and technical support, as well as – though less frequently- on participatory approaches.

52. **MTR redesign.** When the CBARDP was re-designed after the CPE and MTR in 2008-09, its objectives were adjusted to focus more on agriculture and economic growth, while completing existing infrastructures and strengthening community and local government capacity to sustain them. A revised logframe was prepared. This was highly relevant to the evolution in national policy which brought in a focus on achieving rapid and sustained economic growth through the Vision 20:2020 in 2009. The NEEDS was replaced by the ATA in 2011.⁴³ At the same time, the extent to which this shift reflected the needs of the rural poor who up to that point had

⁴³ The ATA is aimed at promoting agribusiness, attracting private sector investment in agriculture, adding value to local agricultural produce, developing rural infrastructure, and enhancing access of farmers to financial services and markets. The ATA set out to reposition agriculture to drive Nigeria's economy and create over 3.5 million jobs along the value chains of priority crops relevant to the CBARDP states including rice, sorghum, cassava, horticulture, cotton, livestock and fisheries.

placed the highest priority on investments in water, health and education cannot be confirmed by this PPA.⁴⁴

53. **Overall assessment of relevance.** Programme objectives were coherent and well-aligned to Government policies and the priorities of the poor. The design, although ambitious, was sound and built on previous experiences. Relevance is rated *satisfactory* (5).

Effectiveness

54. The programme had three objectives, which were by and large achieved. They are discussed in turn in this section. What became obvious from the PPA field visits, however, is that the level of effectiveness also varies immensely between locations. For some village residents who received direct assistance, the CBARDP has made a major economic difference, whether from agriculture, processing or small business assets; while for others the benefits were more marginal, such as from improvements to roads or clinics.
55. Objective 1: Empower the poor rural women and men to critically analyze their constraints, opportunities and support requirements and to effectively manage their own development agenda. This was the central theme of CBARDP: to strengthen and widen the CDD approach across a vast area of northern Nigeria. There was a clearly articulated approach to deliver this objective, based on past experience, and elaborated through detailed implementation guidance in the appraisal working papers and the Programme implementation manual. The systematic sensitization and formation of community groups and CDAs took place across all 207 selected village areas. The creation of these bodies allowed them to take control of their own development, prioritize choices and then plan and implement the selected investments. Funds were passed to accounts fully controlled by the CDAs, who then procured services and made disbursements.
56. The evidence from the MTR, completed at a point when the community empowerment work had passed through three rounds or tiers, judged that the process had been effective.⁴⁵ It noted that awareness raising and sensitization work has been commendable; numerous groups have been formed covering topics such as agriculture, enterprise, health, sanitation and nutrition; strongest results have occurred in terms of group mobilization and Community Action Plan preparation. The community groups have appreciated their role in leading the process of development and in managing resources.
57. From the PPA field visit, out of 27 CDAs visited, all but three were found to be in operation, with representatives available to discuss their activities and share their records. The PPA team found that the CDAs demonstrated reasonable confidence in their relations with local government officials and in managing the programme assets. Their financial viability appeared fragile, however, as they could not demonstrate up-to-date bank records or membership details. They did show a commitment to maintain the assets provided under CBARDP, especially the social and community infrastructures. In Unguwar Lawal village area, the CDA had mixed success in raising routine maintenance contributions from households using the improved water supply, but when the supply broke down, they were able to raise funds and arrange for emergency repairs to the pump electrics. In the same village area, the bank records of the CDA were examined and found to contain just NGN5,545, while two years earlier the balance had reached NGN3.5 million.⁴⁶ The CDA Treasurer had no record of persons who had received funds and how much

⁴⁴ According to the IFAD Country Office, programme management undertook a rapid assessment of the community priorities to validate the CPE/MTR recommendation. The report has not been available for this PPA.

⁴⁵ The MTR made use of field evidence from an independent study. See MTR Preparatory Impact Study, Sept 2006. It reported that "communities are fully sensitized and gaining confidence in assessing their needs" p.68.

⁴⁶ A visit to the Micro Finance Bank in Aliero.

those receiving economic assets would be repaying. This is not to say that all the funds were unaccounted for, but it demonstrates the limited capacity to maintain written records.⁴⁷

58. **Objective 2: Support institutionalization of the programme policies and processes, create awareness and develop the capacity of public and private sector service providers to become more relevant and responsive to the needs of the rural poor women and men.** This was a complementary objective to Objective 1, ensuring that the supporting environment for the rural poor would align with and support their efforts.
59. Considerable resources were devoted to achieving the second objective - the majority of capacity building expenditure. Some 7,000 staff and service providers were trained, for example, although there is no target against which to judge this level of effort, and there is likely to be some double counting as officials and others had repeat trainings. Whether this has led to behaviour, process or policy changes that reflect the needs of the rural poor amongst the providers is the key issue. Certainly, federal, state and local government systems were adapted to channel resources directly to communities, and credit agencies have provided substantial credit flows. The increasing flow of Government resources into the programme and the adoption of CDD approaches beyond the CBARDP areas signify that the programme's approaches have been institutionalised. (See Box 6 and para 129). Reluctant governors have been persuaded to support the programme, including those such as Borno, that did not commit funds for the first three years. The use of government structures rather than creating separate project units has also built ownership and understanding. Partnerships with a wide range of research institutes, service providers and development agencies have been a positive factor supporting this objective. Songhai and Notore are particularly relevant in terms of their experience in offering support for small agri-businesses and inputs, and there are other examples such as International Crops Research Institute for the project Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) work on on-farm farmer managed research trials and Bank of Agriculture (BOA) and Development Exchange Centre (DEC) involving micro-credit.⁴⁸
60. From the PPA field visit, it was evident that state and local government council personnel were continuing to work closely with the CDAs. The Planning Officers in particular were reported to be in regular contact with CDA committee members to help monitor and to oversee maintenance of assets. Since the CBARDP closed, new projects have arisen, and these were in some instances being coordinated by the CDA with the local government.
61. **Objective 3: Support balanced sustainable social, agricultural and economic development interventions for appropriate village groups and individuals.** Given that the previous two objectives lay the platform for this objective, the main focus of CBARDP investments was on delivering material benefits by programme completion. From the documentary evidence, there has been substantial delivery against all categories of investment. But the objective also indicates that these interventions should be balanced and sustainable. Initially, interventions were driven by a Community Action Plan and by community prioritization that addressed major service delivery gaps and felt needs, so that balance would be seen in terms of working towards a more equitable service provision across sectors. The loan extension deliberately sought to then fill in gaps and avoid stand-alone assets.

⁴⁷ In all the CDAs visited in Kebbi State, the metal filing cabinets were damaged and insecure. On inspecting the files, very few of the asset files were up to date, and most had initial notes showing the first meetings and distribution of funds, but no subsequent follow up records or M&E.

⁴⁸ Supervision mission 2012, p. 16 mentions that BOA and the Development Exchange provided NGN88 million credit in 2011/12, and that farmers repaid up to 95 per cent.

62. The PPA undertook a rapid field assessment in four states to verify a sample of assets in terms of their operational status two years after programme closure and level of beneficiary use. Forty-three investments were visited in 20 village areas covering 25 categories. The results are presented under *Sustainability* below. But from the fieldwork it can be noted that the delivery of interventions has been highly concentrated within the selected village areas and LGAs, broad in scope, and reaching a broad spectrum of men, women and youth, many of whom are poor and some of whom are vulnerable. The high concentration of CBARDP support in targeted villages will have created some imbalance between these villages and non-CBARDP villages until such time as services are also delivered to other locations.
63. **Community infrastructure.** From the range of schools, clinics, water systems and roads all concentrated in the 207 village areas, there has no doubt been a major improvement in access to education, health and other community facilities for all or most residents in these locations, an achievement supported by the impact study findings. The investments were chosen by the communities, and significant contributions provided in labour and materials, and hence these structures are generally well used and appropriate. In most cases, these assets are available to the whole community and therefore to the poor, particularly where no fees are involved such as for roads and water. Most of the investments have been maintained by the community as well as the local government. During the PPA field visit, there were many examples of schools or clinics being run and staffed by government workers, and in some cases had been expanded with more classrooms or beds to increase the number of pupils or patients, sometimes from local government funding and in other cases by other donors.
64. The exception to the usual experience of continuing support and maintenance were the skill training centres. The three examples seen in the field were all in poor condition and under-used or abandoned. This seems to be related to the difficulty of finding and funding suitable trainers to run courses, and the problem of maintaining equipment such as knitting machines or welding equipment which is not easily serviced locally. The common ownership of these centres has also prevented them being run in a viable way.
65. **Sustainable agricultural practices.** Greater use of improved practices and inputs has been made possible through the mix of trainings, support to input shops, engagement of partners such as Notore, and increase in credit. The impact study reports increase in use of agro-chemicals, inorganic and organic fertilizers and improved feeds. Comparison with the baseline data was not done in the impact study, and there are difficulties with the data that prevent such an analysis. Measuring changes in ownership of livestock was reported, and the impact study results show a 10 per cent rise in cattle ownership. However, changes in ownership of other animals are too high to be trusted.
66. The examples of improved practices can be linked in many instances to higher outputs: the PPA field visit found good results for onions in Sokoto, soya beans in Katsina and watermelons in Jigawa. Focus group discussions with farmers in Jigawa state revealed that an irrigation scheme has made it possible to engage in farming all year round. In Sokoto, farmers said the onion and rice production has been very good lately to the extent that onion merchants go into their remote areas with large vehicles to buy onions at wholesale prices from them.

Box 1

Case study: onion and chilli farmer, Kebbi State



A physically-disabled farmer in Unguwar Lawal, Kebbi State, received an irrigation pump and seeds in 2008. As a result, his production of onions, chillies and peppers at least doubled on his two acres. He employed three labourers and after repaying the funds he bought a motorbike to rent, and began trading produce for others. Sadly, he lost a son from ill health and his motorbike and some produce was stolen. But he continues farming successfully.

67. Farmer field schools (FFS) are one activity which has not been as successful as planned, with the PPA field visit noting limited uptake in Kebbi State, and poor quality reported elsewhere (supervision missions in 2011 and 2012). This seems to be due to weak linkages between the SSO and the extension staff under the Agricultural Development Programme (ADP).
68. **Rural enterprises.** Some 1,588 jobs are reported to have been created in off-farm enterprises out of a target of 2,692.⁴⁹ Processing activities are reported to be the leading off-farm income-generating activity, and this improvement was especially effective in reaching and benefitting women. This included groundnut, rice paddy, food, and fish processing. Baseline to impact study comparisons in the proportion of respondents trained in processing show increases for Katsina (31 to 56 per cent of respondents) and Kebbi (5 – 11 per cent), but there were apparent decreases for Yobe (27-24 per cent) and Zamfara (27 – 13 per cent). The PPA field visit met six examples of successful village processing businesses in Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa and Katsina States.

Box 2

Case study: Youth employment, Katsina State



A water borehole in Yanhoho Kaita LGA, Katsina State, provides income for youths who fetch water free of charge from the borehole in their jerry cans and sell at NGN10.00/20litre gallon. The CDA approved this as a measure adopted to engage youth in income-generating activities.

⁴⁹ Supervision mission 2013, para 11.

Box 3

Case study: Shoe factory, Jigawa State



A shoe making project was supported in Bardo village, Taura LGA, Jigawa at a cost of NGN2 million. The equipment was taken by the beneficiaries to Kano, to operate closer to the market, and the building has been abandoned, much to the anger of the community.

69. **Credit** access has also been a major achievement of the programme. According to the impact study, the number of people that were linked to financial institutions increased from 5,127 in 2004 to 78,825 in 2012. In addition, the amount of loans given increased from NGN2 million in 2004 to NGN74 million in 2012. It is not clear though who provided these loans and repayment levels are also reportedly mixed, especially with regards to informal credit. The financial service associations (FSAs), while they have been successful in mobilising savings through share capital, the impact study view that they have limited outreach is correct, since with 138 FSAs formed and an average membership of less than 100, direct beneficiaries are not likely to be higher than 14,000.
70. **Gender and vulnerable men** – The impact study reports that over 2,547 income-generating activities were implemented by the programme, out of which 51 per cent reached women and 10 per cent vulnerable men. Since food processing is counted as part of these activities, there would seem to be double counting with the rural enterprise component.

Box 4

Case study: women's perfume enterprise, Kebbi State



A perfume-making enterprise run by women in Jiga Birnu, Aliero LGA, Kebbi State, has successfully supported over 30 women in making pomades, perfume and other products. Initial beneficiaries have paid back the funds received, and the products have been exhibited in various fairs as far as Abuja.



71. **Beneficiaries.** The appraisal target was to reach 400,000 households estimated to contain 2.8 million persons at 7 per household. With the withdrawal of Kano state, the target would have fallen to 2.4 million. The estimate for the actual number of direct beneficiaries given in the PCR is however 1.2 m (and 172,000 households) or some 43 per cent of the original planned figure, or around half of the revised

target.⁵⁰ In general, the underlying basis for the beneficiary numbers given in the PCR is not given, and when one compares the number of beneficiaries per activity type there are some unlikely results. For example, the average direct beneficiaries per educational and health facility is 14 individuals, for roads it is 9 but in contrast per agricultural activity it is 56. Despite these difficulties in beneficiary counting, if one accepts the reduced beneficiary numbers reported in the PCR, there are still discrepancies to be explained. If so many of the targets for outputs were exceeded, then why are there not more direct beneficiaries? If one assumes that all village area inhabitants benefited directly in some way from one or more CBARDP assets, then the estimated maximum number of beneficiaries would be around 2 million.⁵¹ At the very least, there was a failure in the programme to define beneficiaries and count them in a transparent and accurate way. The pressure to count different types of activity achieved against targets, and to record numbers of beneficiaries for each in an exclusive way, has made it difficult to really estimate actual numbers.

72. **Overall assessment of effectiveness.** The delivery of a wide range of assets was satisfactory in the 207 village areas targeted. It was a highly concentrated approach, reaching up to five per cent of the total population in the seven states. The CDD approach has led to greater ownership and control of development resources by communities, and the institutionalization of CDD approaches among service providers was pursued effectively, enabling funds to flow to communities and building partnerships. The PPA rating for effectiveness is *satisfactory* (5).

Efficiency

*"Since they used direct labour projects undertaken by the CDA committees, projects like roads, irrigation schemes, earth dams, drainage, open wells/boreholes, health clinics and school classrooms were all built with an average of 50 per cent cost of what would have been by the Government"*⁵²

73. **Implementation efficiency:** CBARDP suffered a significant delay of 17 months before reaching effectiveness. This was due to delays in appointing staff, opening accounts and initial counter-part payments. The programme continued to experience difficulties in the release of counterpart funds, particularly from Borno State. Since this slow start, the disbursement rate and volume of funds disbursed accelerated dramatically from 2010 when the loan extension occurred and the disbursement rules changed (see para 20), and has outperformed other IFAD operations in Nigeria.
74. From an efficiency perspective, the early period of under-use of loan funds and the need to grant a three-year loan extension penalized IFAD's overall loan portfolio. Also, the fact that the additional loan funds in 2010 were given, at least in part, in order to complete works already started, implies that the original funds had not been used to maximum efficiency. Nevertheless, greater efforts were made by IFAD in the final three years to better manage the complexities of the Nigerian Government's federal budgeting system. This resulted in the final very high final disbursement rate of 93.4 per cent.
75. Because the flow of funds management was decentralised, with the funds being allocated directly to each of the seven participating states, each state was

⁵⁰ As the PCR states, the number of indirect beneficiaries would include many more persons such as those who were able to take part in the awareness and capacity building activities, those who were household members of direct beneficiaries, as well as people who generally benefited from road improvements, health services and water supplies, which could reach the entire village area population and beyond in some cases. Not acknowledged by the PCR, however, is the possibility of double counting. There is no doubt that when a range of investments are clustered within a single village area, that many of the same households would be likely to benefit from different assets.

⁵¹ Assuming an average of 10,000 inhabitants in 207 village areas.

⁵² "The Community Driven Development Approach – Building Fourth Tier of Government where there was none", A Kankia, 2013.

consequently accounting for and submitting withdrawal applications individually. The lack of consolidation resulted in a total of 465 such applications being made. This was much higher than normal for IFAD, and represents a high transaction cost for both IFAD and the Government. Average processing time was 39 days, with 32 days for IFAD processing. Variations stand out though: the lengthiest overall processing time for a withdrawal application was 161 days, and the shortest 7. For IFAD processing, the lengthiest processing time was 81 days, while the shortest was 1 day.⁵³

76. **Cost per beneficiary.** The PCR reports that the cost per beneficiary, taking into account all programme costs at appraisal, was US\$36, while at close the figure was US\$89, an increase caused by a combination of the reduced number of direct beneficiaries and the loan extension and additional financing. For the CDF component the PCR figures were US\$17 at appraisal and US\$49 at completion. Breaking this down further, the costs per beneficiary for health, education and skills development centres was reported as US\$233, roads was US\$104, income generation, water and gender and vulnerable groups was US\$51, while the lowest was for agriculture at US\$32. Given the poor uptake in some of the skills training centres seen during the PPA mission, these appear to represent the worst value for money.
77. Comparison with the World Bank's Community-based Poverty Reduction Programme (CBPRP) shows that CBARDP investments focussed on fewer beneficiaries than the CBPRP because of its policy of clustering investments in a small number of village areas. This has resulted in a higher cost per beneficiary (US\$89 per beneficiary for CBARDP, compared to US\$10 for CBPRP). CBARDP provided around 5,500 community-level investments in 207 communities at an average cost of US\$10,000.⁵⁴ For the World Bank's CBPRP, the average costs for the 2,999 projects delivered in 3,085 communities have been twice as high, at US\$20,000 per community-level investment.
78. It has also proved difficult to find comparable costs per unit for CBARDP assets compared to Government or other donor programmes. Nevertheless, some evidence was obtained that indicated greater efficiency under CBARDP compared to CBPRP and Government implemented assets.⁵⁵ It was not possible to investigate these comparisons in detail, but one likely factor explaining the lower costs under CBARDP was that works or equipment were usually obtained or undertaken by direct hire rather than through the use of contractors, and this avoided commission costs. From the physical assets visited, on the whole the quality of construction appeared sound where the asset was still being used.
79. **Financial analysis.** No cost-benefit analysis was conducted at appraisal or in the PCR, and there is no documentary evidence of any financial analysis of the economic investments, such as in agriculture or rural enterprises. The PCR offers cost-return ratios for five crops and three enterprises, which show a cost-return ratio higher than 1:2 for all cases except sorghum and millet, but the basis for

⁵³ Data for CBARDP Withdrawal Application (W/A) processing times is only available for 2013. No comparison with previous years can be made due to IFAD changes in processing time methodology. (data obtained from IFAD's Controllers and Financial Services Division on 24/08/2015).

⁵⁴ 5,500 community level investments (rather support for individual farmers or entrepreneurs) see: The Community Driven Development Approach – Building Fourth Tier of Government where there was none” by A. Kankia 2014.

⁵⁵ Interviews during the PPA field visit in Jigawa State gave some indication of efficiency. For example, rice milling machines were supplied to IFAD at NGN500,000 while under the World Bank FADAMA project they cost NGN550,000; irrigation hand pumps supplied to IFAD cost on average NGN0.2 million while for the same units the River Basin Development Authority paid NGN1.2million; solar water panels supplied to IFAD cost NGN5-6 million while the state government pad NGN10 million. Also the SPO Jigawa reported that while he had approval to spend NGN1.6 million to drill boreholes, he later drilled them at NGN0.6million without compromising quality. Similarly he had approval for construction of three-classroom blocks at NGN4.5 million but actual construction was NGN2 million. From the PPA field visit, eight schools of two classroom blocks each were inspected across four states with all of them built between 2005-2010. Their average total cost was NGN1.6 million. This compares to a government cost of NGN5.5million and a CBPRP cost of NGN2.2 million (World Bank PPAR of CBPRP, p.31).

these estimates is not explained. From the PPA field visit, for the economic assets observed, there have been very positive returns obtained, particularly where individual-level enterprises have occurred, but it is difficult to know how representative these cases are of the population as a whole.

80. Finally, CBARDP may have fostered greater *allocative efficiency*, given that the limited available resources were directed towards the investments considered more useful by the local communities, hence investments would be maintained because they would have been seen as relevant and responding to local needs. Equally, by concentrating investments within a limited number of village areas, there would have been significant savings in terms of supervision and support from the local government and state, and the likely catalytic effect of inhabitants in a single location being supported in a multi-dimensional manner.
81. **Overall assessment of efficiency.** Efficiency was weak in terms of slow initial disbursement and high costs per beneficiary compared to appraisal. However, the programme had achieved lower unit costs and good allocative efficiency. The PPA rating for efficiency is *moderately satisfactory* (4).

B. Rural poverty impact

82. Although the programme conducted both a baseline and an impact study, the data cannot be used to determine CBARDP's impact because each used different questionnaires and sampling methods. The baseline survey in 2004 covered only the 1st tier of villages.⁵⁶ The impact study in 2013 sampled all 207 village areas, but took a small sample per village area of 25, covering 5,175 household interviews and 2,070 communities across seven states (see annex VII).⁵⁷
83. **Household incomes and assets.** From programme evidence, there is some justification for there being an increase in assets in targeted village areas. The large number of social and economic investments that occurred over the 10 years of the programme, and being so concentrated within each of the targeted village areas, provide a strong case for there being a marked growth in assets and rises in income for many direct beneficiaries. Making any kind of quantified estimate of income change is difficult given the lack of empirical evidence, and attributing it to CBARDP is also problematic. Whether other LGAs and village areas not supported by CBARDP saw rises in income or assets is unknown, and even within the CBARDP localities there were several other development actors delivering improvements. The PPA field visit noted that often newer structures funded by the Millennium Development Goals programme, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and others were installed and the state government also were supplementing CBARDP investments, especially for schools, clinics, roads and water supplies.
84. The impact study reports that 3,000 beneficiaries either built new houses or improved their houses due to the impact of the programme – which is actually rather a modest claim given that there were thought to be 172,000 direct beneficiary households. Some 1,588 new jobs were created from village enterprises alone (tailoring, carpentry, welding, etc.) while no records were available for agriculture-related employment (supervision mission report 2013, p.3).
85. PPA analysis of the baseline and impact study indicates a major shift from thatched roof houses to metal zinc roofs: at baseline only a quarter had a metal roof while

⁵⁶ Those joining the programme in the first year, and not those joining in the second and third years.

⁵⁷ Neither survey presented an analysis of data quality or of statistical accuracy (such as number of error cases, level of precision of sample estimates). The baseline survey was a much shorter questionnaire than the impact study and presented results mainly at state level. No explanation was given as to the exclusion of Borno State and the low sample obtained in Kebbi State. The impact study report used a data set of around half of the original sample, implying that there were considerable error levels.

10 years later around 60 per cent had them. Bicycle ownership rose from 16 to 42 per cent of households. Use of formal credit also showed increases, from less than 5 per cent at baseline to on average 17 per cent of households accessing formal credit⁵⁸ in the impact study. These figures are well above the average of access for the rural population of Nigeria of 2 per cent or below.⁵⁹ These few examples appear to indicate a very positive change, however without comparable figures for non-CBARDP areas, whether such improvements can be attributed to the programme are unclear.

86. Available state and zonal statistics from national surveys⁶⁰ provide estimates for a range of indicators covering poverty measures as well as health, education, employment and agricultural production. Overall, national statistics point to a broadly negative trend, with rising unemployment, poverty and inequality in the seven northern states, thus implying limited economic impact of the combined poverty reduction initiatives. Data at LGA level are not available and at state-level are inconsistent.
87. In summary, while there is an indication that CBARDP contributed to improved incomes and assets, it appears that this impact has been highly localised, benefitting only a small number of beneficiaries. Impact on household incomes and assets is therefore rated *moderately unsatisfactory* (3).
88. **Human and social capital and empowerment.** In terms of health, CBARDP provided new and upgraded health centres, adult education and training of traditional birth attendants (TBAs). TBAs were regarded as the most acceptable form of support to mothers in rural Islamic areas served by the programme. Given that 4,200 TBAs were trained under the programme (impact study), there is a reasonable basis to assume increased use of TBAs by mothers. The levels of reduced infant and maternal mortality reported in the impact study are very high indeed: in some instances dropping by a quarter or more. For example in Katsina State, the maternal death rate before support was 2,248 per year but this fell to 518 per year subsequently. The average number of infant deaths reported in the impact study Community Survey was 18.6 per village area before the programme and 5.4 per village area afterwards, while maternal deaths fell from 13.9 to 3.5 per village area.
89. If one compares these figures to national statistics, then there has not been a decline on these levels over the same 10 year period. Millennium development goals (MDG) figures show that nationally infant mortality fell only from 81 per 1000 births in 2000 to 75 per 1000 in 2010 and then to 69 in 2013, although in the north, mortality rates worsened.⁶¹ Maternal mortality has also fallen but much less dramatically over the same period, from 704 in 1999 to 576 per 100,000 births in 2012.⁶² If the impact study survey figures are correct, this would mean the village areas supported by the programme have done exceptionally well. However, such substantial decreases would require further verification.
90. If such changes are verified, then there is also the question of the extent to which these changes are due to CBARDP. During the PPA field visit it was observed that there were several other programmes and actors supporting health outcomes in the same village areas, and some of these were more recent and the facilities in better condition. Without being able to compare health statistics from CBARDP village areas against other village areas in the same LGAs, it would be difficult to

⁵⁸ Defined in the survey as commercial banks, micro finance banks, development banks, government agencies.

⁵⁹ RUFIN Formulation Report 2005, chapter 2C.

⁶⁰ including the Nigeria Census 2006, Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire, Harmonised Living Standards Survey 2010, General Household Survey 2010/11 and 2012.2013.

⁶¹ MDG Report 2010, Nigeria.

⁶² National Bureau of Statistics and UNICEF data, quoted in the World Bank PPAR of CBPRP p. 3, 2014.

draw any firm conclusions as to the extent to which CBARDP investments alone could account for the impacts claimed.

91. In terms of education, there are no specific metrics available in the impact study or RIMS on changes in literacy or numeracy, as these were not measured. The only statistic available is the proportion of impact study respondents who said that increased literacy was one of the benefits of CBARDP in their village; 90 per cent answered in the affirmative. Nationally literacy rates have improved (57 per cent of adults to 65 per cent between 2003 and 2006, and now 81 per cent for young adults of 15-24 years-old. Figures available at state-level in the North are hard to interpret, however. For example, as annex X, table 2 shows, there are very improbable changes over the timeframe and also questionable differences between states.
92. CBARDP's CDD approach has made a contribution to building social capital. Prior to CBARDP, the communities had very few social groups; not more than two or three in the village areas comprised of only male members, who only meet whenever the need arose. A total of about 8,280 farmer groups with male and female participation have been formed in 69 LGAs across the seven states. The farmer and community groups then formed 207 CDAs that further identified the constraints and opportunities facing their communities and prioritized their needs in order to prepare Community Action Plans for each CDA. Having up to about forty or more groups representing different interests, trades and businesses in a village area made the communities more able to take responsibility for their development and increased their capacity for collective action.
93. In summary, the PPA feels that while some of the evidence base is incomplete and inconsistent, on the other hand, there is better evidence to support the programme's claims for empowerment, although thematic studies could have verified this in more detail. Based on this analysis, for human and social capital and empowerment, the programme is rated *moderately satisfactory* (4).
94. **Food security and agricultural productivity.** The final supervision mission in 2013 provides very positive figures for crop production increases (although not for livestock or fish production) and notes their contribution to ATA targets. NGN1.2 billion have reached smallholder farmers as a result (which pro rata equates to about US\$20 per household). No sources are given for these figures.
95. The impact study reports marked increases in productivity and yields for crops and livestock. The PCR repeats these figures, as does the CASP design documentation.⁶³ Yet the source of such increases relies on the impact study, the results of which are not regarded as reliable by the PPA. For example, the impact study compares CBARDP farmer yields for various crops against state-wide figures, though the sources for the latter figures are not given.⁶⁴ On re-analysis, the yields derived from the impact study data do not match those given in the impact study report, and the data variation does not give confidence that there could be a statistically significant difference between state-level averages and programme farmers.⁶⁵
96. This issue of attribution also arises strongly in the sustainable agriculture development component. There are a range of other programmes supporting agriculture in the CBARDP states, and because these are not often discrete, visible investments (such as schools or clinics), it is not easy to detect where or how they

⁶³ Although according to the Project Completion Digest, productivity increases for all the commodities are still marginal as in spite of the increase in productivity, the yields obtained in some locations are still below the optimum compared to yield attainable in similar agro-ecologies in West Africa.

⁶⁴ Table 20, Impact Study Tables Report.

⁶⁵ For rice for example the average yield is 1.88 t/ha from the impact study data, but the standard errors are large and imply the true mean could lie between 1.2 and 2.6 t/ha at 95per cent confidence. There are some impossible extremes values (120t/ha).

have added to CBARDP support to farmers. The World Bank FADAMA programme operated in Kebbi State, for example, supporting supply of irrigation equipment and improved techniques and seeds, and its PCR reported sharp income increases for its beneficiaries.⁶⁶ Subsidised fertilizer supplied through the ATA federal government programme was distributed to many farmers across all the CBARDP states. The high adaptation rates given in the impact study for use of fertilizer will to some extent be due to this initiative.

97. In summary, while there are strong claims from CBARDP sources that it contributed to improved food security and agricultural productivity, the evidence base is weak and the attribution question is not addressed. Therefore, the rating is *unsatisfactory* (2).
98. **Natural resources, the environment and climate change.** More modest improvements are noted in the PCR in this area. Only 2 per cent of total CDF expenditure was devoted to sanitation and environmental projects.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, through improved water and sanitation, adult education and soil conservation activities, there have been achievements in this area, though there is little evidence on how these activities delivered wider environmental changes. The loan extension and additional financing agreed in 2010, emphasised the importance of improving the environmental quality of CBARDP's micro-projects, "especially water shed management, soil quality, tree cover and pasture development".⁶⁸ More recent supervision missions noted that because of weak maintenance, some of the infrastructure is not adhering to environmental safe-guards (supervision mission report 2013, p. 2).
99. In summary, due to the paucity of evidence in this domain, the rating is *unsatisfactory* (2).
100. **Institutions and policies.** The institutionalization of the CDAs as a 4th tier of government can be regarded as a major impact of CBARDP. To varying degrees this village area level form of community-based development architecture has been adopted across the programme area and beyond, and is here to stay. Despite occasional political interference in the selection of leaders⁶⁹, the CDA structure and the policy of community-driven planning, management of resources and maintenance of assets has been adopted widely. Local and state government officials have been sensitised and now appear to regard their role in a different light, as facilitators of locally-expressed needs rather than providing direction and control.
101. FSAs are also certainly now well-established village level micro-credit entities that are run and owned by the shareholders, most of whom reside in the community. While their establishment has been successful there are questions as to their viability (supervision 2013).⁷⁰ Weak repayments may be due to the innovative nature of short-term credit, charging interest in a setting where Islamic lending traditionally does not charge interest but 'profit shares'. FSAs also generally are owned by the less poor, as share capital is a minimum of NGN1,000, and most loans are given to traders and agri-businesses. Still, these entrepreneurs in turn will provide employment and also buy products from the poorer residents.

⁶⁶ Implementation Completion and results Report, Second Fadama Development Project, July 2012.

⁶⁷ Project Completion Report, appendix 5.


⁶⁸ Letter from A. Barry Country Programme Manager Nigeria to K. Cleaver, Assistant Vice President, IFAD April 2010.

⁶⁹ The PPA field visit noted that membership of the PDP party was often a requirement for the selection of CDA officials. CDA chairmen were also noted to be government officials in Masama village area Kebbi and in Kwadiya village area in Dutse, Jigawa.

⁷⁰ The PPA field visit noted that repayment levels vary: in Masama village in Kebbi there were 27 borrowers with loans overdue out of 70 members. The Masama FSA nevertheless was in a healthy state having increased its bank balance from NGN356,000 at start up in 2012 to NGN1.4 million in 2015.

102. The institutionalization of the pro-poor and community driven approach under Objective 2 rested on a number of assumptions: the continued commitment by all the three tiers of government to put in place effective pro-poor policies and institutions and to allocate an increasing share of technical and financial resources to the programme; sufficient diversity of public/private/non-governmental organization service providers available to the communities; local government councils willing to adopt a pro-women stance and recruit and train additional women to work in the communities; training skills and resources are available for community work, particularly for women and the vulnerable; the ability of women to participate in training and other community development programme activities; and political stability. Three indicators were designed to monitor the more responsive service providers: (i) higher levels of state funding reaching the poorer and more vulnerable groups; (ii) satisfaction levels with the performance of local government and service providers; and (iii) increased numbers of female implementing agency staff.
103. Unfortunately the M&E system, the impact study and the PCR did not address these indicators, so it is not possible to make a firm judgement on the question of how service provision has become more relevant to the poor. No surveys or thematic studies of key policy makers or service providers were conducted to ascertain their awareness or adoption of pro-poor policies or actions. There is evidence from the MTR and elsewhere that at local government-level there was weak capacity to take on board the principles imparted by CBARDP. It is hard, therefore, to find solid evidence that service providers have become pro-poor. But one can surmise that given the increase in Government funding to the CBARDP village areas, especially in the later years, the first indicator has likely been met, though without an analysis of overall state expenditures by type of recipient there is no firm evidence that the proportion of pro-poor spending has actually increased.
104. Figures obtained from several states indicate a mixed record in terms of continuing funding for CDD approaches. Sokoto State (figure 2), as an example, also indicate the continuing and growing Government commitment to support the CBARDP processes, at least for one state.

Figure 2
IFAD, State and Local Government funding in Sokoto State 2003- May 2015



Source: Sokoto CBARDP State Support Office.

105. On the other hand in Jigawa State, despite the replication described in Box 6, funding from the State and the LGAs was provided on a very intermittent basis during the programme life, with years when no funding was given (2006, 2008, 2009, 2010), and funding reportedly ceased after 2013, implying that the Government did not continue supporting CDAs after that. Also in Jigawa, the

overall Government contribution (NGN748 million) was less than IFAD's (NGN1.4 billion) and surprisingly less than the communities (NGN1 billion).⁷¹

106. **Overall**, the PPA believes that there is sufficient documentary and field evidence to warrant a rating for impact on institutions and policies. The institutionalization of CDAs has been the most significant impact of CBARDP, and FSAs are also well-established. For the impact at local government level, there is a more diverse and incomplete picture, but some states appear to have sustained their commitment to CDD. The PPA rating is *satisfactory* (5) for this impact domain.
107. Overall, poverty impact could not be rigorously measured due to the methodology issues in the impact study. While the concentrated nature of CBARDP support is likely to have contributed to increased incomes and improved social capital, the evidence is incomplete. Government data for the northern states show that poverty has worsened despite the investments from Government and other development partners. Overall poverty impact is rated as *unsatisfactory* (2).

C. Other performance criteria

Sustainability

108. Findings from the asset verification exercise conducted during the PPA field visit indicated a mixed record in how well the various community assets were being maintained and used. A rating system was used to assess the current level of use and condition of each asset.⁷² Overall the findings were fairly good, with about 74 per cent of the sample (34 out of 46) rated as being in either reasonable or good working order and being successfully maintained by the relevant village committee (annex IV - table 2).⁷³ The highest ratings were found in Sokoto and Kebbi, and the poorest rating in Jigawa. The lower cost assets had better ratings – often economic assets run by individuals (welding, sewing, threshing, milling, irrigation) were continued successfully and had given the selected poorer beneficiary a significant increase in income.
109. In terms of sustainability of service provision by Government, observations from the PPA field visit indicated that since the IFAD loan closure, the operational capacity of the former SSO staff in the ADP offices is limited.⁷⁴ The state government staff seconded to the ADP continue to operate within these restrictions, and are also working for other projects, such as Fadama III and Markets2 (United States Agency for International Development), but the dependence on external financing is obvious, and staff are waiting for the follow on programme from IFAD (CASP) in order to initiate new activities rather than maintaining existing ones. Much of the decision-making rests with the State Governors and their interest and commitment in extending these programmes. With a new administration just in place following the 2015 elections, the policy direction and level of funding is still uncertain.⁷⁵
110. In terms of the sustainability of the CDAs and other village associations, the PPA field visit found that the CDAs still exist and operate in terms of electing leaders and holding meetings, and the Community Action Plans are still prepared. Maintenance committees are often weak (supervision mission 2013), and there are indications that some are slowly withering, that the sub-committees are not very active and that regular meetings have reduced significantly. Financial management and record keeping are also not in good order and in at least one instance there

⁷¹ Figures provided from Jigawa SSO.

⁷² 4 = full working order and maintained, 3 = reasonable working order, 2 = poor/partial damage, partly maintained, 1 = not working or not maintained.

⁷³ This compares rather poorly though with the World Bank CBPRP which had 90 per cent still operational four years after completion including 95 per cent in Yobe. (PPAR, p. 22).

⁷⁴ The Kebbi State former CBARDP office located in the ADB compound in Birnin Kebbi for example is very dilapidated with no recurrent budget to run electricity or internet. Of 11 programme vehicles only four are still operational.

⁷⁵ Interview with Permanent Secretary (and acting Commissioner) of Agriculture, Kebbi State.

was no written proof of any remaining funds from the reflows from economic assets (paragraph 57). The village associations formed since the inception of CBARDP seem to be the same ones up till now without forming new ones.⁷⁶ This means that the number of beneficiaries has not really increased over the years or even if it did the increase is likely to be very low.

111. **Conflict and insecurity.** Northern Nigeria, and in particular Borno and Yobe States, have seen a dramatic increase in insecurity since 2009, as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. While commentators view the insurgency as having immediate causes relating to religious fanaticism and increasing conflict between the Nigeria security and police and the movement's adherents, the wider analysis points to the effects of extreme poverty, unemployment, especially amongst youth, and political corruption as critical drivers. Equally, farmer and pastoralist conflicts have been an issue in some parts of the programme area such as Borno (supervision report 2003).
112. CBARDP supervisions make little mention of Boko Haram having had any effect on programme activities. The CASP design documents prepared in 2013 refer to curfews affecting development activities in the North East, as well as the influence of displaced persons. But these may have occurred towards the very end of the CBARDP, and according to the IFAD Programme Officer have therefore not had an effect on programme delivery by the time the programme has been closed.⁷⁷ The Yobe SPO reported that in his state the programme had been less affected than in Bornu since then. But some programme vehicles had been taken in 2014 and supervision of remote villages had to be suspended, but in general programme activities continued. But there are cases where further investments in CBARDP communities were not realised because of expected insurgencies and destruction.
113. **Overall.** PPA findings show that although the CDAs still exist and continue to function, the record of sustaining community assets is mixed. The operational capacity of the former SSO staff in the ADP offices is still limited. The ongoing conflict in the North East may have affected sustainability, although the PPA has not been able to obtain such evidence. Sustainability is rated *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Gender equality and women's empowerment

114. The programme's gender strategy was based on the CDD approach. Women were explicitly one of the main target beneficiaries of the programme and were targeted through the participatory approach. A large number of women benefitted from outreach, sensitization, participation and empowerment. Similarly efforts were made on the part of the programme and local government staff to push forward gender participation, sensitization, and activities. However, with the CDD approach as the main vehicle to mobilise women, the transformative impact of the interventions may not have been as strong because of the limited role and space women have within the existing cultural norms and social structures. Although the programme undertook commendable efforts to target gender perceptions and values, the medium and long-term sustainability and impact of CBARDP on women cannot be ascertained, based on the available evidence.
115. As programme achievements, women beneficiaries are reported to represent 44 per cent of total beneficiaries (RIMS 2012), with the MTR reporting effective representation in many groups despite limited CDA leadership. Nonetheless there is conflicting information, such as RIMS data stating 9,536 groups had women in leadership positions while other sources commenting that women's participation

⁷⁶ For instance in Auyokayi village of Auyo LGA in Jigawa State, the PPA mission found that village associations have not increased in number since the time village associations were formed at the beginning of the programme.

⁷⁷ Interview with B.Odoemena, IFAD Country Programme Officer.

was low, especially in the CDAs.⁷⁸ Female involvement in many CBARDP sub-components was reported as satisfactory, though women were only majorities where women were themselves the targeted group (such as in the gender and vulnerable groups). The Management Information System and RIMS split all activities by gender. In 2012, the RIMS reports that for agriculture activities, women represented between 15 and 33 per cent, for credit groups 48 per cent, and for both marketing and income-generating training, and infrastructure management, a third. While these figures are helpful, there is little deeper analysis of how CBARDP has affected women's lives. The impact study for example only has one table reviewing the impact on gender, and no thematic studies were done to explore this issue.

116. The appraisal logframe included two useful and relevant outcome indicators for women: (i) increased participation of women in making key decisions at community level; and (ii) increased numbers of women staff in implementing agencies. As noted earlier, these indicators were not captured by the M&E system. While there is plenty of evidence of women being involved in groups and receiving a significant proportion of the support under CBARDP, one cannot find sound evidence that women have taken a bigger role in decision-making at the community-level. From the PPA field visit, there was little evidence of women in positions of leadership – all of the CDA leaders met were male. The decision-making opportunities observed were largely to do with women associations formed to access programme funds, which themselves were observed to be collapsing.
117. There were efforts to build an understanding of gender mainstreaming (for example workshops were held in 2009 in three states (Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamkara). However, for most state and local government staff, gender equality and empowerment was taken to mean funding gender activities rather than also mainstreaming of gender issues across all aspects of the programme's interventions, as well as the service providers and Government. This has been a concern noted from the beginning (supervision mission report 2003, p.7) and the 2009 supervision called for a review of the status of women in the programme, although there is no evidence that this was done. Reflecting on this issue, while no numbers are available for the proportion of female staff in agencies, RIMS data (2012) shows that only 9 per cent of government officials receiving training were female. Despite these issues, it is noteworthy that local government gender awareness creation is mainly targeted towards men's traditional attitudes to women's empowerment.
118. The available evidence points to high numbers of participation but low decision-making powers. PPA field visits report that the creation of CDAs was ground-breaking for many women involved, making them participants in activities for the first time. Nonetheless, decision-making was reported to occur only in women's associations rather than at the CDA-level itself. This may reflect the dominance of men in speaking for their wives at the community level. Debating and assigning community needs can still relegate women to passive participants if the CDD approach is not sensitively applied in CBARDP contexts. The high uptake of traditionally female interests and occupations (i.e. health and nutrition, sewing and knitting) and low uptake for female literacy classes indicate that in fact the programme may have reinforced existing roles and stereotypes, because participation in these activities was still sanctioned by husbands.
119. To illustrate the point, there are many examples of women being able to generate their own income in new ways, repaying the funds to the group, and passing on benefits to improve their family circumstances. Particularly successful for women

⁷⁸ Such as the supervision report, January 2009, which even recommended a review of the status of women in the programme.

has been sewing and knitting support. An example from the PPA field visit is given in box 5.

Box 5

Example of successful woman beneficiary

A woman beneficiary in Sabon Garin Dole village area, Goronyo local government of Sokoto State, was given a sewing machine at the cost of NGN12,000 as a revolving loan and she was to pay back NGN1,500 monthly to the CDA. She normally makes NGN3,000 a month but can make up to NGN10,000 or more in a month during festivals. She was able to pay back her loan in eight months; she taught her daughter sewing and was able to give her a sewing machine on her wedding day. She now buys goats to fatten and sell, as another source of income.



120. Yet women are still burdened with having to look after their homes and children with limited resources, and still responsible for fetching water. PPA field visits found that little has changed in terms of women's time and labour except for the women beneficiaries that now engage in some economic activities to help improve their lives. It is noteworthy that these women are further burdened alongside their usual responsibilities, since income from their economic activities is not enough for them to hire labour for household chores.
121. Overall, on gender equality and women's empowerment, while the large involvement of women in a broad range of interventions is commendable, persistent gender conceptions and power relations have clearly limited the effectiveness of the CDD-based gender strategy. The programme is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Innovation and scaling up

122. In terms of **innovations**, the CDA is the most significant innovation, in that it provided the structure and principles for how CDD would work at village level. The rules of operation, including election of officials, the hierarchy of apex committee and sub-committees and the authority vested in these entities by virtue of their transparent democratic structure and because they were entrusted with dispensing programme funds, have given them credibility. As the CASP design says: "In other words, a process of grass-roots mobilization championed by groups and CDAs, have empowered community members to access resources, who have been motivated and assisted to utilize these resources to improve their livelihoods and living".⁷⁹
123. The demonstration of the relatively large scale production of quality certified seeds from producers in Yobe and Jigawa has been a notable achievement with the potential for expansion to other states. Other examples include windmills and use of solar panels, which have improved the reliability of water supply and irrigation systems. Paravet clinics and small agro-input shops are regarded as important village-level innovations run by local trained entrepreneurs that provide easily accessible minor treatments and inputs. Finally, FSAs have been seen as a CBARDP innovation, creating a locally owned and run credit facility at village level that is connected to micro banks.

⁷⁹ CBADRP I, PDR appendix 1.

124. **Scaling up.** There is good evidence from supervision reports and elsewhere that the CDD approach has been scaled up both within the CBARDP LGAs and more widely across the states. The former CBARDP Programme Manager has summarised the situation in 2014 in box 6.

Box 6

Scaling up of CDD approaches in CBARDP states

"By the time CBARDP was being completed, the CDD approach was adopted 100 per cent in Kebbi 21 LGAs, Sokoto 22 LGAs and Zamfara 14 LGAs to cover not only the programme LGAs but LGAs outside the CBARDP within the states. These states were widely implementing CDD activities in these other LGAs across the state with their own state budget. Jigawa with a total of 27 LGAs expanded the CDD approach in additional 5 LGAs and 10 village areas in each of the expanded LGA. It also added one additional Village area in each of the CBARDP 9 LGAs. Katsina State has come up with state wide (34 LGAs) Local Government Community Development committees (CDCs) for the need identification of their communities for incorporating (on priority basis) in the state annual budget. Sokoto State put in place legislation on the CDD model and is being handled by the state assembly. Other donor supported projects, such as the World Bank-funded Fadama III and AfDB-funded CBARDP, have adopted the concept of CDD to drive their rural development activities. For the participating states, state governments have demonstrated a high level of commitment through providing additional financing of US\$14.61 million (refer PCR) to the CBARDP, translating into NGN2.31billion (US\$1: NGN158)."

* A. Kankia, 2013. The Community Driven Development Approach – Building Fourth Tier of Government where there was none.

Source: A Kankia. 2013. *The Community Driven Development Approach – Building Fourth Tier of Government where there was none.*

125. The follow up programme, CASP, is intended to build on CBARDP through 'horizontal scaling up', with plans to replicate the CDD approach. The coverage of 69 LGAs and 207 village areas under CBARDP would become 104 LGAs and 727 village areas. This represents 60 per cent of the total 163 LGAs in the seven states. CASP would continue to build the capacity of existing CDAs, while expanding to new villages. Vertical upscaling is envisaged for the existing CDAs, where increasingly effective internal governance processes will serve as the basis for strengthened market access and linkages to organized markets. These CDAs would support profitable and sustainable relationships between its inhabitants, specifically smallholder farmers, women and youth with markets.⁸⁰
126. **Overall.** The CDD approach and the structures and principles it established have been the most important innovation. There is also evidence that the CDD approach has been scaled up more widely. The rating for innovation and scaling up is *satisfactory* (5).

D. Performance of partners

127. **IFAD.** The performance of IFAD was good in several areas: the quality of the programme design was high; the level of supervision was strong, particularly when IFAD assumed direct responsibility for supervision work from 2009. The adjustment in programme design following the CPE in 2008 and the COSOP in 2010 proved appropriate. However, IFAD underperformed in other areas. It was not until the end of the initial programme period that it addressed the conditionality requirements for fund release. In ensuring the soundness of M&E, IFAD support proved to be inadequate. It did not work to ensure that the gaps and turnover in qualified M&E staff were managed, and it did not support a better design and use of the expensive impact study, as well as the MTR report and baseline surveys. Many

⁸⁰ Climate Change Adaptation and Agribusiness Support Programme (CASP) in the Savannah Belt of Nigeria Final Programme Report, Project 1692, IFAD, May 2013.

supervision missions commented on the problems with M&E, yet no solutions were found.

128. The design envisaged that CBARDP was to benefit from collaborations with multiple donor groups, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), which would specifically benefit the rural enterprises development and financial linkage support component. The 2005 supervision notes that linkages were finally established with FAO's Special Programme for Food Security (SPFS) by learning from its experiences in development enterprise models, but no mention of further collaboration is made in the following supervisions or the PCR.⁸¹
129. In terms of financial management, the quality and timeliness of auditing saw improvements over time. This was in part due to a bottom-up information flow which needed state-level auditors to perform to IFAD standards from the beginning and required several training sessions. Problems were reported with the accounting software that led to its abandonment, re-acquisition, and further training in 2012. Procurement also required urgent staff training on guidelines, and establishment of procedures through manuals, as well as proper design and implementation of procurement plans. Nonetheless the issue of flow of funds due to counterpart funding issues severely limited procurement. Aside from the first supervision mission, there is no mention of types of procurement (national, international, competitive bidding). IFAD's performance is rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).
130. **Government.** The funding contribution from Government was slow in the early stages of the programme, and as noted earlier this hindered implementation and IFAD disbursements. This was not true of all states, but Borno in particular was unwilling to commit counterpart funds, even as late as 2004, and Kano withdrew from the programme before effectiveness. However, by the end of the programme, the overall Government contribution was higher than planned (103 per cent of target). Compared with other IFAD operations, Government performance from this perspective has been strong (annex IX, figure 1). There was good evidence from the PPA field visit of continuing investment and operational support from states and LGA especially towards health and education facilities, particularly in Sokoto and Kebbi. Continuing investment has occurred in some states (Sokoto, Katsina) after programme closure.
131. The PCR summarises the results of CBARDP in a comprehensive manner and elaborates the positive achievements well. However, much of the evidence presented is open to question (beneficiary numbers, rates of return) and the report offers no critical assessment of the M&E data produced by the programme and the impact studies, or the inconsistencies subsequently found by the PPA. Nevertheless, the responsibility for weaknesses in the area of M&E should not be placed on the Government alone. The ambitious M&E design at appraisal and the failure of supervision missions to address this issue are also factors that are largely IFAD's responsibility. The Government's performance is therefore rated as *moderately satisfactory* (4).

E. Overall programme achievement

132. CBARDP made an important contribution in terms of expanding and refining the community-driven approaches initiated by previous IFAD operations. It was very relevant in terms of alignment to Government policy and the IFAD country strategy. The design was also adjusted appropriately later on as it matched the priorities introduced by the ATA and IFAD's CPE. CBARDP delivered an extensive range of investments that were chosen to meet the needs articulated by the beneficiary communities. Around five per cent of the rural poor living in the seven states of northern Nigeria have been given income-raising opportunities and had their access

⁸¹ CBARDP Appraisal Report Volume I December 2001 (p. 10), CBARDP supervision mission February 2005 (p. 7).

to health, education and other services enhanced through over 20,000 social and economic assets. Women, for first the first time in the selected village areas, were given a significant role in choosing and operating relevant investments.

133. The impact of these assets on the poverty levels of the target population is difficult to detect due to gaps in the M&E system, particularly in the lack of sound survey data to statistically determine and attribute observed changes to programme interventions. Nevertheless, the sustainability of a significant proportion of the assets, skills and credit systems supported under the programme remains good two years after programme closure, and the evidence available indicates that the majority of state governments involved have continued to support the CDD approach. The PPA's rating for the programme's overall achievement is *moderately satisfactory* (4).

Key points

- The objectives of CBARDP were coherent and relevant to the Nigerian policy context, and aligned with IFAD's COSOP. Its scope was highly ambitious geographically and in terms of the pace at which CDD approaches were expected to be understood and adopted.
- After a slow start, the delivery of support through training, institution-building and provision of assets was effective. The number of estimated beneficiaries on the other hand was fewer than anticipated, although the methodology for counting lacked clarity.
- The CDD approach has led to greater ownership and control of development resources by communities, and most CDAs are still in existence. However, their financial viability is fragile.
- Institutionalization of CDD approaches amongst Government and non-government service providers was pursued effectively in terms of enabling funds to flow to communities and building of partnerships. Real changes in quality of service provision and greater satisfaction levels from service users are difficult to detect, due to lack of evidence.
- The delivery of a wide range of assets was satisfactory in the 207 village areas targeted. It was a highly concentrated approach, reaching up to 5 per cent of the total population in the seven states.
- Efficiency was weak in terms of slow initial disbursement and high costs per beneficiary compared to appraisal. But efficiency was better in terms of lower unit costs for many assets than comparator projects, with good allocative efficiency and a final disbursement rate of 99 per cent.
- Impact could not be measured rigorously due to methodology issues in the surveys, especially the lack of counterfactual evidence. While the concentrated nature of CBARDP support is very likely to have increased incomes and improved social outcomes, the evidence is incomplete. Overall, state and zonal trends for northern Nigeria show that poverty has worsened.
- The large involvement of women in a broad range of interventions is commendable, but persistent gender conceptions and power relations have clearly limited the effectiveness of the CDD-based gender strategy.
- The CDAs still exist and continue to function, but the record of sustaining community assets is mixed. The operational capacity of former SSO staff in the ADP offices is still limited.
- The CDD approach and the structures and principles it established have been the most important innovation. There is also evidence that the CDD approach has been scaled up across the states.

IV. Conclusions and recommendations

A. Conclusions

134. CBARDP was an ambitious programme intending to change in a fundamental way how donors and Government worked with rural communities on the planning and implementation of development activities across northern Nigeria. While the programme took some time to become effective and then to overcome disbursement difficulties, it eventually managed to release significant resources substantially within the control of local associations. While reliable beneficiary numbers are difficult to pinpoint, there is strong evidence of capacity building and service delivery to 207 village areas, which over 10 years received support of around US\$57 million through the CDF, or US\$275,000 per village area.
135. This level of concentration has brought significant benefits to the selected village areas, and also built confidence and ownership amongst those at village level who were engaged in the CDD process or who benefited. Such was the level of concentration that it is understandable that IFAD became known as the leading form of assistance in the programme village areas. Poverty impact remained highly localised though, reaching less than 5 per cent of the total population in the seven states. The overall picture from national statistics shows that poverty trends have been worsening in CBARDP states.
136. The CDAs as a 4th tier of government have been the most important impact created by CBARDP. This village area level form of community-based development architecture has been adopted widely across the programme area and has been sustained beyond the programme duration. Testimonies received by the PPA suggest that community organizations have shown a considerable level of resilience, even in conditions of insecurity and conflict.
137. CBARDP's community-driven approach has built on lessons from previous projects and delivered material benefits for communities. The CDD approach has led to greater ownership and control of development resources by the rural poor. Communities have mobilised high levels of contributions resulting in higher value for money for community assets. The institutionalization of CDD approaches among service providers was pursued effectively, enabling funds to flow to communities and building partnerships. The transaction costs for the decentralised fund management were relatively high though and have resulted in relatively high costs per beneficiary.
138. At the same time, the CDD approach has been less effective in transforming existing power relations and addressing issues of inequality within communities. The CDD approach provided a ground-breaking opportunity for many women to participate, but they were usually passive participants in the community-level debates and their role in decision-making remained limited. The reinforcement of conventional roles through the CDD approach was mirrored by the high uptake of traditionally female interests and occupations (i.e. health and nutrition, sewing, perfume making and small livestock rearing) and the opposite trend in particular for female literacy classes.
139. The significance and impact of CBARDP could have been better established if the M&E system had provided a more solid evidence base to establish the effectiveness of the CDD approach. The overambitious design of the participatory M&E system was out of step with the capacities at community level. It seems a missed opportunity that the participatory M&E, which would have been a major asset for the CDD programme, was never fully realised.
140. While CBARDP's community-driven investments have reversed a supply-driven approach to development, it has appeared to work better in terms of social mobilization and empowerment than for economic management of development assets. In the broader context, CDD has been to some extent superseded in the

Government's (and IFAD's) move towards agricultural transformation and greater emphasis on markets, value chains and promoting agriculture as a business.

141. Has CBARDP gone beyond the more limited achievements of the very comparable project from the World Bank (CBPRP)? The World Bank Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) noted that CBPRP "was not successful in institutionalizing the community-based development approach. The project established a synergy between communities and state agencies based on a transfer of funds and training to support micro-projects, but a similar relationship was not established with the government at local, state, or federal levels".⁸² The CBARDP did succeed to a greater extent than the CBPRP in achieving linkages between community and government. This is partly because of the longer timeframe, with the loan extension period from 2010-2013 seeing the largest disbursements and most rapid level of asset creation of the whole programme period, but also because the period for strengthening links between LGAs and the CDAs was that much longer. But it was also because of IFAD's known and consistent commitment to people-led approaches that has featured strongly in its portfolio in Nigeria from the mid-1990s.

B. Recommendations

142. Provided below are some key recommendations for consideration by IFAD and the Government.
143. **CDAs.** *Formalise the role of CDAs.* Under CBARDP, social inclusion, transparency and accountability have been enhanced. But at the same time, CDAs maintain poor records, have limited accounting skills and there is limited reflow of assets. In future, greater support for financial management as well as basic literacy and numeracy are needed. For sustainability, there is a case that this '4th Tier' of government should have a budget, salaries and operating costs provided by the LGA, as is found in similar village level administrations elsewhere.⁸³ In future operations, such as CASP, IFAD should seek to focus on providing greater support for bringing about state legislation to provide a legal basis for CDAs to operate and be sustained.
144. **Monitoring and evaluation.** *Provide appropriate guidance on participatory M&E and impact studies.* While routine monitoring and financial reporting has been largely satisfactory, much greater attention should be paid to: (i) proposing a more appropriate participatory approach to M&E at community level, so that it is aligned with local capacities and interests; and (ii) conducting more suitable evaluation surveys that consider the counterfactual, use sound data cleaning and verification, apply statistical tests to explore the meaningfulness of the data, and above all adopt a more objective approach to interpretation of the evidence. In addition, useful thematic studies need to be undertaken to provide insights on programme performance and emerging issues.
145. **Gender.** *Address power relations and social values through culturally appropriate gender strategies.* While important strides have been made in bringing greater equity to women in terms of sharing development resources and being given greater opportunity to manage their own investments, in future greater efforts to bring women into decision making structures such as CDAs are needed, even though this is not straightforward in the more conservative Islamic culture found in northern Nigeria.
146. **Counting beneficiaries.** *Provide differentiated guidance on how to categorize beneficiaries and monitor benefits.* The IFAD RIMS has encouraged a strong focus on counting different categories of beneficiaries, however there needs to be greater

⁸² World Bank, CBPRP, p. ix

⁸³ Such as in Tanzania.

attention given to how beneficiary numbers are defined and counted (to avoid double counting for example). Greater support also needs to be given to balancing the top-down indicator focus with a stronger analysis of who benefits (i.e. targeting).

Rating comparison

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>IFAD-Programme Management Department (PMD) rating^a</i>	<i>PPA rating^a</i>	<i>Rating disconnect</i>
Project performance			
Relevance	4	5	1
Effectiveness	5	5	0
Efficiency	4	4	0
Project performance^b	4	5	
Rural poverty impact			
Household income and assets	5	3	-2
Human and social capital and empowerment	5	4	-1
Food security and agricultural productivity	4	2	-2
Natural resources, environment and climate change	4	2	-2
Institutions and policies	6	5	-1
Rural poverty impact^c	5	2	
Other performance criteria			
Sustainability	4	4	0
Innovation and scaling up	5	5	0
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	4	-1
Overall project achievement^d	5	4	-1
Performance of partners^e			
IFAD	4	4	0
Government	3	4	1
Average net disconnect			-0.6

^a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.

^b This is not an average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

^c This is not an average of ratings of individual impact domains.

^d This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, rural poverty impact, sustainability, innovation and scaling up, and gender.

^e The rating for partners' performance is not a component of the overall assessment ratings.

Ratings of the project completion report quality

	<i>PMD rating</i>	<i>IOE PCRV rating</i>	<i>Net disconnect</i>
Scope	5	4	-1
Quality (methods, data, participatory process)	5	4	-1
Lessons	6	5	-1
Candour	5	5	0

Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.a. = not applicable.

Basic project data

			Approval (US\$ m)		Actual (US\$ m)	
Region	West and Central Africa	Total project costs	68.5		99.7	
Country	Nigeria	IFAD loan and percentage of total	29.9	43.7%	42.9	
Loan numbers	564-NG (1) 564-A-NG (2)*	Borrower	31.5	46%	39.9	
Type of project (subsector)	Rural development	Technical assistance facility grant	3.0	4.4%		
Financing type	F	IFAD grant	-		0.1	
Lending terms*	Highly Concessional	Cofinancier 3				
Date of approval	12 September 2001 (1) 16 September 2010 (2)	Cofinancier 4				
Date of loan signature	11 December 2001 (1) 24 October 2010 (2)	Beneficiaries	4.0	5.8%		
Date of effectiveness	31 January 2003 (1) 24 September 2010 (2)					
Loan amendments	25 May 2007 **	Number of beneficiaries: (if appropriate, specify if direct or indirect)	400,000 households, and 2,500,000 (direct) beneficiaries		1,207,909 (direct) beneficiaries(3)	
Loan closure extensions	1 extension of 36 months for loan 564-NG					
Country programme managers	Perin Saint-Ange (2001-2006, 2008-2009) Hamed Haidara (2007) Abdoul Barry (2009-2012) Atsuko Toda (2012)	Loan closing date	30 September 2010 (1)		30 September 2013 (1 & 2)	
Regional director(s)	Mohamed Béavogui (2001-2010) Ides de Willebois (2012)	Mid-term review	From 13/11/2006 to 20/12/2006		From 13/11/2006 to 20/12/2006 (Report – April 2007)	
Officer responsible for project performance assessment	Johanna Pennarz	IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)			97.9% (1) 78.7% (2) 93.4% (1 & 2)	
Project performance assessment quality control panel	Ashwani Muthoo and Mona Bishay	Date of project completion report			19 February 2014	

Source: President's Report; PCR; GRIPS; FlexCube.

(1) There are four types of lending terms: (i) special loans on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (ii) loans on hardened terms, bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of 10 years; (iii) loans on intermediate terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to 50 per cent of the variable reference interest rate and a maturity period of 20 years, including a grace period of five years; (iv) loans on ordinary terms, with a rate of interest per annum equivalent to one hundred per cent (100%) of the variable reference interest rate, and a maturity period of 15-18 years, including a grace period of three years.

(2) Top-up loan.

(3) As quoted in GRIPS. PCR states 1,120,692 (appendix 4.E).

Evaluation framework

Core valuation criteria	Evaluation question	Data source/data collection method
Relevance	Q1: How well did the CBARDP design align with Nigeria's sector policy and strategy and with the needs of intended beneficiaries?	This involves assessment of alignment with NEEDS/SEEDS/LEEDS and then ATA, and other relevant national documents e.g. on finance, land, research, extension services. Equally, at local level, this requires some assessment of whether the approach and detailed designs were appropriate to the beneficiaries' needs in terms of their farming or employment opportunities.
	Q2: How appropriate were design of the community-driven approaches across the different projects?	This would include examination of funding mechanisms and 4th tier structures (CDAs, FSAs) through review of CBARDP documentation; <u>Project documents:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • President's report • Loan agreement • Formulation report • Appraisal report • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs)
	Q3: Did (i) the wide geographical coverage and (ii) the flexible range of investments (termed a 'carte-blanche' in the CBARDP PCR) to invest in any type of infrastructure support effective targeting of the poorest communities?	Review of CBARDP documentation; <u>Project documents:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formulation report • Appraisal report • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report • Project impact assessment Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; other development partners) Use of national statistics to assess appropriate poverty focus in choice of states
	Q4: How well has the CBARDP approach been linked to the rest of the Nigeria portfolio? To what extent did CBARDP's CDD approach build on past experiences and has it been replicated within IFAD's portfolio in Nigeria?	Review of Katsina and Sokoto PCRs; review of CBNRDP design documents and progress reports
Effectiveness	Q5: How strong is the evidence for the delivery of benefits claimed in the PCR and other project progress/ M&E reports?	Estimate from a contribution analysis perspective, drawing on a more theoretical analysis of how and why project activities would achieve intended results.

		<p><u>Project documents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report • Project impact assessment <p>Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; selected groups of beneficiaries)</p> <p><u>Field survey:</u> systematic crosschecking of selected benefits and results in sample locations</p>
	Q6: How far can we attribute the results to the project directly?	<p>Analysis which would include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Probing the robustness of the available evidence from the project; Testing the likeliness of change happening as a result of IFAD interventions Reviewing comparative cases (including those from other DPs) and Mapping the available evidence against the Theory of Changes and assessing the strengths of the causal linkages.
	Q7: Why was outreach not as high as planned (e.g. 43% for CBARDP) across the operations, and what were the consequences of this on outcomes and impact? (And to what extent did growing insecurity affect outreach?)	<p>Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; selected groups of beneficiaries)</p> <p><u>Field survey:</u> systematic crosschecking of selected benefits and results in sample locations</p>
	Q8: To what extent was the wide range of interventions that were supported a challenge to both implement and then also to assess effectiveness.	<p>Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; private sector actors; selected groups of beneficiaries)</p>
Efficiency	Q9: What were the consequences of the delays in start-up and in release of counterpart funding? And more specifically, what was the influence of these delays on setting up and conducting good M&E from the start?	<p>Analysis of disbursement data, to establish extent of delays</p> <p>Case studies, based on interviews with former project staff, inquiring about the consequences of late disbursement</p>
	Q10: To what extent did the huge geographical coverage and the multi-tiered management structure affect the efficiency of the portfolio?	<p>Case studies, based on interviews with former project staff, inquiring about the consequences of the programme stretch</p>
	Q11: How have delays in disbursement affected performance (positively or negatively)?	<p>Case studies, based on interviews with former project staff, inquiring about the consequences of late disbursements (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff)</p>
	Q12: Using project records, what can be said about value for money of the different investments, compared to national or regional benchmarks for unit costs for different resources or for cost versus quantity/quality of outputs?	<p>Project accounts</p> <p>Benchmarks from other projects, government agencies, private sector</p>
Sustainability	Q13: How far have the improvements continued and been replicated by others (such as other donors, private sector, and local governments)?	<p>Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; private sector; other development partners)</p>
	Q14: What external factors have affected sustainability (e.g. security, oil prices, political interference, conflict and insecurity)?	<p>Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; other development partners)</p> <p>Background analysis and studies</p>

	Q15: Have the 4th tier institutions (CDAs, FSAs) been maintained or replicated? There is reported evidence of CDD approaches being copied in northern states, and also micro finance operations.	Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; other development partners)
Impact	Q16: For income and assets, what is the real evidence for the substantial increases reported in the project PCRs? Equally for food security and productivity, is there substantiated data to justify the ratings?	<u>Project documents:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report • Project impact assessment Other studies and data, e.g. national statistical reports
	Q17: The PCR hails the formation of local groups and associations, as well as in capacity of different levels of government as the 'most significant contribution of CBARDP' in the area of institutional impact. Has this '4th tier' of government resulted in better service delivery to and empowerment of remote villages?	Key informant interviews (IFAD; federal and state government staff; local government staff; selected CDAs and FSAs; selected groups of beneficiaries) <u>Field survey:</u> systematic crosschecking of selected benefits and results in sample locations
Other evaluation criteria and issues		
Gender and youth	Q18: Which mechanisms and interventions were the most effective in supporting women and youth?	<u>Project documents:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report • Project impact assessment Focus group discussions (former PSO staff, local government staff, selected groups of beneficiaries)
	Q19: There are major claims for inclusion of women beneficiaries (e.g. in CBARDP the CPR says that 41% of beneficiaries were female), can these be substantiated?	Review of project M&E data (field office) and available surveys/studies; <u>Review of Project documents:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mid-term review • Supervision reports • Project completion report • Project impact assessment
CDD	Q20: How effectively did local groups and community bodies manage and interact with local government and other service providers?	Focus group discussions in sampled CBARD locations (former PSO staff, local government staff, selected CDAs and FSAs; selected groups of beneficiaries) Phone interviews with former project staff/local government Different stakeholders can be questioned to gain insights into how communities have taken responsibility or are holding service providers to account.
M&E	Q21: Why did M&E systems not respond satisfactorily to the challenge of capturing project results and impacts? Was it because of unrealistic designs/indicators, poor M&E implementation, or to the complex	Review of M&E documentation and system (field office) Focus group discussion with IFAD staff and former PSU/M&E staff Check if M&E reports included national statistics or national survey data

	implementation arrangements? Given the CDD nature of some projects, are there successful examples of where M&E was participatory / community-led?	
Innovation and scaling up	<p>Q22. What evidences is there that the CDD approach under CBARDP has been scaled up across non-participating states?</p> <p>Q23. To what extent was the wide range of investments funded by the CDF either a limitation or an advantage? Would a more focused approach had a greater impact?</p>	<p>Linked to questions Q14 and Q16</p> <p>Within states (LGAs) (state/LGA interviews + docs) Across states (to non-participating states) (review of state legislation changes, other donors adopting (World Bank), funding Documents, and LG / community interviews</p>
Performance of IFAD	Q24. How reliable a basis for tracking project performance is the IFAD ratings system?	<p>Linked to questions Q3, Q9, Q10 and Q11</p> <p>Analysis of ratings system against documentary supporting evidence</p>
Performance of partners	Q25. What explains the delayed and limited Government's contribution, and was IFAD's eventual decision to provide a funding amendment (with 100 per cent IFAD funding) a sound action?	Linked to questions Q3, Q9, Q10 and Q11

PPA asset verification

Annex IV - Table 1

PPA asset verification form

DATE

STATE/LGA

VILLAGE/LOCATION

GPS

TYPE ASSET

COST OF ASSET

CONDITION OF ASSET

RATE CONDITION OF ASSET

WHO BENEFITS FROM THE ASSET? GROUP OR
INDIVIDUAL?

GENDER/AGE

FIRST TIME ACTIVITY OR FOLLOW UP?

ANNUAL AVERAGE MAINTENANCE COST

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1-ESTIMATED ECONOMIC BENEFIT, 2-ESTIMATED ECONOMIC LIFE 3-ESTIMATED
SCRAP VALUE

Annex IV – Table 2

PPA asset verification ratings from field visit

Category	State	LGA	Village Area	Asset type	Year bui	Cost	Direc	Cost/ben	Rating
Social	Jigawa	Auyo	Auyokayi	Hand pump		650,000	40	16,250	●
Economic	Jigawa	Auyo	Auyokayi	Grain Thresher		250,000	1	250,000	●
Economic	Jigawa	Auyo	Shawara Auyokayi	Rice mill		600,000	1	600,000	●
Economic	Jigawa	Dutse	Kasarau	Poultry farm		1,500,000	1	1,500,000	●
Social	Jigawa	Taura	Bardo	School		1,117,000			●
Social	Jigawa	Auyo	Auyokayi	School		800,000			●
Economic	Jigawa	Taura	Bardo	Skills Centre		2,100,000			●
Economic	Jigawa	Auyo	Auyokayi	Drainage Canal		700,000			●
Economic	Katsina	Kusada	Kofa	Input shop		45,000	1	45,000	●
Economic	Katsina	Jibia	Daga	Grinding machine		85,000	1	85,000	●
Economic	Katsina	Kaita	Abdulawa	Millet farm	2015	72,550			●
Social	Katsina	Bindawa	Gaiwa	Water pump		12,000			●
Social	Katsina	Bindawa	Gaiwa	School		1,607,650			●
Social	Katsina	Kaita	Nanjogel	Clinic	2012	1,500,350			●
Social	Katsina	Kaita	Yanhoho	Borehole	2013	750,000			●
Social	Katsina	Bindawa	Rugare Bade	Clinic		580,000			●
Social	Katsina	Jibia	Daga	School	2010	1,800,000			●
Social	Katsina	Kaita	Kafin Mash	Clinic	2011	1,500,350			●
Economic	Katsina	Kaita	Yanhoho	Drainage Canal	2012	733,000			●
Economic	Katsina	Kaita	Yanhoho	Input shop	2009	100,000			●
Social	Katsina	Jibia	Farufaru	School	2010	1,715,750			●
Social	Katsina	Jibia	Daga	School	2008	1,200,000			●
Social	Katsina	Kaita	Abdulawa	Borehole		650,000			●
Economic	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Fish farm			5	0	●
Social	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Solar panel for wat	2010	1,200,000	3000	400	●
Social	Kebbi	Gwandu	Jiga Birnu	Clinic	2004	2,100,000	5000	420	●
Community	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Road	2005	1,560,000	3000	520	●
Social	Kebbi	Gwandu	Masama	School	2005	6,600,000	2000	3,300	●
Economic	Kebbi	Gwandu	Masama	FSA	2012	585,000	70	8,357	●
Economic	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Irrigation pump		15,000	1	15,000	●
Economic	Kebbi	Gwandu	Jiga Birnu	Welder		20,000	1	20,000	●
Economic	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Orchard		20,000	1	20,000	●
Economic	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	Skills Centre	2008	1,800,000	40	45,000	●
Economic	Kebbi	Gwandu	Masama	Reafforestation deg	2005	20,000			●
Community	Kebbi	Gwandu	Masama	CDA					●
Community	Kebbi	Aliero	Unguware Lawa	CDA	2005				●
Economic	Sokoto	Goronyo	Sabon Gari	Groundnut Processing		850,000	1	850,000	●
Economic	Sokoto	Wamako	Wajeke	Bakery		1,690,000	1	1,690,000	●
Economic	Sokoto	Goronyo	Rimawa	Skills Centre		2,400,000			●
Community	Sokoto	Goronyo	Sabon Gari	Dispensary		1,949,000			●
Economic	Sokoto	Wamako	Wajeke	Rice mill		1,690,000			●
Social	Sokoto	Goronyo	Sabon Gari	School		1,600,000			●
Community	Sokoto	Goronyo	Sabon Gari	CDA		500,000			●
Community	Sokoto	Goronyo	Rimawa	CDA		491,000			●
Community	Sokoto	Rimawa		CDA		490,000			●
Economic	Sokoto	Goronyo	Sabon Gari	Sewing machine		12,000	1		●
Economic	Sokoto	Goronyo	Rimawa	Knitting machine		12,000	1		●
Economic	Sokoto	Goronyo	Rimawa	Cow		70,000	1		●
Economic	Sokoto	Wurno	Kwagaba	Goats		5,000	11		●

Appraisal report logframe



INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

APPENDIX 3 Attachment 1

Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	
<p>Goal:</p> <p>To improve the livelihoods and living conditions of poor rural communities, with emphasis on women and other vulnerable groups</p>	<p>Sector Indicators: With emphasis on rural women, men and vulnerable groups in the CBARDP area:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced number of people below the USD 1 per day poverty line • Reduced no. of female headed HH below poverty line • Improved access to social and economic infrastructure • Improved productivity and cash incomes • Reduced number of malnourished children under 5 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gender disaggregated national/state household income and poverty studies • Programme impact assessment studies • Nutrition surveys 	
Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Critical Assumptions/Risks (to realise Development Goal)
<p>Purpose:</p> <p>Through appropriate capacity and awareness building, institutionalise participatory community driven development processes and policies which:</p> <p>i) empower poor rural women and men to initiate and monitor rural development activities in their communities</p> <p>ii) make public sector and other service providers more relevant and responsive to the needs of the rural poor women and men</p> <p>iii) provide balanced sustainable social and economic development interventions for village women's and men's groups and individuals</p>	<p>Outcome/Impact Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 234 VA communities and their female and male interest groups determining resource allocation and actively participating in the assessment, planning and implementation of solutions to their needs • Increased participation of women in key decisions at community level • Higher levels and proportions of state and local government resources reaching the poorer and more vulnerable groups including women • No. of communities applying for, and succeeding in securing, outside funding for community activities (FGN, NGO or external development agency) • Increased skills and capacity of staff in at least 78 LG areas and lower levels to implement community led rural development activities • Increased numbers of implementing agency female staff at community, LG area and state levels • Increased participation of female staff at LGC and state level in developing and implementing community driven development policy and activities • No. of new interventions added to 'menu' based on updated community prioritised needs during programme period • Increased rationalisation, decentralisation and client focus of service providers to rural communities • Number of LGCs and communities outside Programme Area using CDD approaches to rural development • 234 village area communities and their interest groups satisfied with performance of local government and service providers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre and post community needs assessments • Pre implementation and annual gender disaggregated staffing records from all implementing agencies • VA, LGC and state government AWP/Bs • Evaluation reports including evaluation of sample micro-projects and beneficiary / environmental impact assessments • Progress reports • Supervision reports and mid-term review • Programme completion report 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political stability maintained • Women have time and are able to participate in training and, other CD and programme activities • Gender related aspects of the Programme are implemented effectively • Women and other vulnerable groups can use the skills transferred • Sufficient acceptable training resources are available for community work, particularly with women • LGCs and states adopt a pro-women stance • LGCs and states are willing to recruit and train additional women to work at community, LGC and state levels • Continued commitment by all three tiers of government to put in place effective pro-poor policies and institutions and to allocate an increasing share of technical and financial resources to community based rural development • Diversity of public / private / NGO service providers available to community • Economic activities offered through CBARDP remain profitable



APPENDIX 3 Attachment 1 (Continued)

Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Critical Assumptions/Risks (to realise Purpose)
<p>Purpose: (continued)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of infrastructure micro-projects operational and maintained after completion and, planned and actual numbers of beneficiaries • Proportion of community development funds used each year for each group of activities • Prevention of further, and reversal of current, land degradation • Increased food production in programme VAs • Changes in functional literacy and numeracy rates in the target groups • Improvements to environmental sanitation conditions in programme communities • Increased incomes for farm and micro enterprises in programme villages • Additional funds contributed by LGCs to community development interventions above IFAD loan requirements 		
Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Critical Assumptions/Risks (to realise Purpose)
<p>Outputs/Results:</p> <p>Output 1. Increased capacity and awareness of rural communities and, differentiated female and male interest groups, to critically analyse their constraints, identify opportunities; prioritise, plan and monitor appropriate social and economic development activities; and, source additional support and funding to manage and invest in their own sustainable development</p>	<p>Output Indicators:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 234 village area and community plans prepared and updated annually • VA and community plans specifically include higher than proportional interventions targeted at poor women and men • Participation levels of poor female and male vulnerable groups in planning process and then implementation of community group plans • Numbers of community groups continuing group planning activities and managing implementation of planned interventions • Full community contribution and operation of community managed accounts • Changes in proportions (funds) of community identified activities directed to needs of poor women and men • Number and types of activities implemented by different groups • Improvements in community group dynamics to solve differences, mediate conflict • Changes in group leadership style, delegation of responsibility and decision making processes • Reduced conflict within and between groups, particularly on land tenure and with pastoralists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community plans and LGC AWP/Bs • Minutes and observations on group and community meetings • Progress reports • M&E reports • Community self-assessment reports • Village area self-assessment and M&E reports • Supervision reports and mid-term review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traditional authorities and local elites do not dominate planning process or subvert broad-based participation of poorer groups • Women allowed to participate in planning process • Continuing commitment of governments and development partners to principle of community contribution • Presence of experienced trainers in participatory approaches

APPENDIX 3 Attachment 1 (Continued)

Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Critical Assumptions/Risks (to realise Purpose)
<p>Output 2. Increased capacity and awareness of FMARD, NPC, FMOF, local governments and states to support, monitor and evaluate planning and implementation of community-based rural development and to formulate effective pro-poor policies.</p> <p>Output 3. Social and economic development projects and programmes supported by community and CBARDP inputs to:</p> <p>(i) support to vulnerable groups by improving basic life skills and support and extend traditional approaches for poor vulnerable groups</p> <p>(ii) encourage sustainable agricultural practices</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of staff trained in required ToT and participatory skills • No. of programme LGCs and states which institutionalise the community driven development processes • No. of LGCs and states outside CBARDP area which adopt and institutionalise the CDD planning and implementation processes • Number of interdisciplinary teams in 78 LGCs working in 234 village area with community interest groups, assisted by state level expertise • Range of public/private/NGO service providers used by communities • Increased rationalisation and decentralisation of service provision • Planning, financial management and M&E units in PCU, PSO, state agencies and LGCs functioning effectively • Improvements in PCU / PSO coordination, technical support and M&E of state based rural development programmes and projects • Timely administration and effective monitoring of flow of funds • Community-based rural development programmes monitored by the NPC and FMARD • Changes to national rural development and/or poverty reduction policies led by programme activities or coordination groups <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No. of participants completing innovative adult literacy and numeracy, health education, HIV/AIDS awareness programmes • No. of village groups assisting disadvantaged community members through traditional services/approaches <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of technical manuals prepared and made available • Number of staff and farmers trained in different skills • Increased knowledge amongst farmers and field extension workers of a range of better land husbandry practices suited to their local area • Evolution of crop yields, farm production & revenues over 5 years • Diversity of trees/productive species/varieties and farmers/communities initiatives to tackle problems on-farm and within village area • Increased linkages between crops, livestock, forestry • Ratio of organic to inorganic input use, and nutrient balances • Reduction in the geographic area affected by soil erosion (wind and water) and soil fertility decline • Increased productive capacity within communal rangelands and woodlands 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre and updated training needs assessments (TNAs) • AWP/Bs • MOUs/Partnership agreements • Partners performance reports • Progress reports • M&E reports/beneficiary assessments • Audit reports • Supervision reports, MTR and budgets • Reports submitted to CI and IFAD • Programme implementation and M&E manuals produced by PSO • Federal government policy statements and changes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LGC and PSO M&E databases • Training course evaluations • Pre, post community TNAs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Community self-assessment land husbandry status reports • Technical manuals • Land husbandry practices catalogue • Photographic record of land degradation reversal • Progress reports • M&E reports • Supervision reports and mid-term review 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Willingness of LGCs to participate in the programme, adopt the principles, and comply with disbursement conditions • LGC staff capable of absorbing training and will remain with LGCs after training • State level agencies willing to provide technical assistance to LGCs and work in multi-institutional public / NGO teams • ADP/ARDAs do not dominate decision-making/ service provision and crowd out emerging private/NGO initiatives • Presence of experienced trainers in participatory approaches • PCU resources fully used to support CBARDP • FMOF and SMOF staff assigned to oversight financial management • Principles initiated in CBARDP are universally accepted <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Qualified service providers available • Target groups can be sensitised to future benefits of upgrading knowledge and skills • Communities want to strengthen traditional welfare safety nets • Community ensures that adequate community development resources are allocated to these interventions (also agriculture and MEMFS) • LG councillors and traditional leaders accept representative community development plans <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Heavily subsidised external inputs by one or more tier of government discourage efforts to make better use of organic matter and natural approaches to enhancing soil fertility • Fadama developments increase environmental concerns including conflicts between farmers and pastoralists • Presence of qualified service providers

APPENDIX 3 Attachment 1 (Continued)

Intervention Logic	Key Performance Indicators	Means of Verification	Critical Assumptions/Risks (to realise Purpose)
(iii) develop more numerous dynamic and profitable rural enterprises operated by women, men and members of vulnerable groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of enterprises formed/strengthened and disaggregated by gender, wealth strata and business type • Number and quality of business and technology skills training sessions to female and male entrepreneurs • Changes in training courses offered to existing businesses and potential entrepreneurs • Evolution of individual enterprises financial results • Individual enterprises organisational sustainability • Loan recovery rates for outside credit sources • Level of access to and utilisation of formal and informal credit and other services by farmers and micro enterprises • Levels of savings mobilisation by village women and men's groups • Impact on the community and sustainability achieved through support to village level saving and credit associations • Continuing improvements to skills and capacity of community, LGC and state level MEMFS staff • Adoption of MEMFS component activities by non programme LGCs and states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baseline surveys • Support staff progress reports • Systematic entrepreneurs self-evaluation of training and other specific support services, such as credit • At regular intervals, sampling of participating and non-participating enterprises, examination of their books and interviews of the entrepreneurs • Thematic studies • Credit supplier reports • Supervision reports and MTR • Pre programme and progressive training needs analysis for staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Federal and state policies avoid introducing distortions, for example: subsidised credit or inputs not accessible to all VAs • Local and state governments increase their efforts in rural infrastructure investment and maintenance • Presence of qualified service and training providers • Commercial lending rates continue to decline
(iv) improve social infrastructure with ongoing O&M	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of relevant technical and O&M manuals prepared and made available • Number and types of micro-projects implemented • Proportion of community members needing proposed social infrastructure who directly benefit from each micro project • Proportion of poor vulnerable women and men benefiting from each social infrastructure micro project • Proportion of total community benefiting from social micro projects • Proportion of engineering staff using community driven development participatory planning techniques for micro project development • Proportion of projects where designs are modified to suit community needs/requirements • Percentage of micro project construction costs recycled within community (through employment and/or using local contractors) • Proportion of micro-projects constructed by community • Communities knowledgeable on O&M, where support services and spare parts are available and funding part or all of support • Community maintenance fund established and operational and O&M arrangements for each community infrastructure operating sustainably with secured income flow 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical and O&M manuals • VA AWP/Bs and annual reviews of activities • Community self-assessment reports • Progress reports • M&E reports • Supervision reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Broad-based community participation in priority setting • Community aspirations for social infrastructure can be incorporated into a balanced community development plan which does not restrict other interest group formation, development and consolidation • Communities are willing and able to take on management and financing of O&M • Good technical quality of planning and implementation • Matching LGC funds readily available • Communities absorb training and approach • Engineering consultants, construction supervisors and construction contractors sympathetic to community participation in implementation are readily available

Community development fund costs and beneficiaries by sub-project

Total expenditure, number of beneficiaries and average cost per beneficiary by sector of CDF sub-projects^a

S/N	Activity type	Actual number	Direct beneficiaries from PCR	Expenditure (NGN)	% of expenditure	Estimated expenditure by beneficiary (NGN)
1	Rural water supply facilities	(2 458) ^b 1 879	201 083	1 351 497 249	14%	6 721
2	Education facilities	(684) 883	33 983	1 299 029 861	14%	38 226
3	Health facilities	1 197	34 685	1 156 956 241	12%	33 356
4	Rural access roads	492 (km)	21 850	374 293 748	4%	17 130
	Culvert construction and rehabilitation	136	9 336	124 764 582	1%	13 364
	Drift and drainage construction/rehab	288	6 509	124 764 582	1%	19 168
5	Skill development centres/ marketing/processing facilities	726	26 797	1 060 962 313	11%	39 593
6	Hall construction (CDA, FSA and para-vet and environment)	709	326 966	400 471 358	4%	1 225
7	Sustainable agriculture development	6 567	369 046	1 874 607 003	20%	5 080
8	Rural income-generating activities	(11 064) 11 202	66 489	593 096 663	6%	8 920
9	Gender and vulnerable group development	(4 558) 3 711	111 166	977 626 398	10%	8 794
	TOTAL	(28 879) 28 116	1 207 909	1 207 910	100%	

^a PCR, appendix 4, table F, but amended because the item 9 on gender was incorrect. However the source and reliability of these figures is in general hard to ascertain because of inconsistencies in the various RIMS and progress reports, and the fact that data available are up to 2012 so that works completed in 2013 the last year of execution are not captured.

^b Figures in brackets are taken from the AWPB 2012 report and reflect where different figures are found to those in the PCR. Figures in bold are where figures match.

- Community infrastructure** – This included the construction of 207 CDA offices in each of the village areas to act as a focal point for the community and for the various farmer and enterprise groups formed under the programme. In addition, support for community infrastructure was provided that covered: water supply, health and school facilities, roads, skills development, agriculture, rural enterprises and facilities for women and vulnerable groups. These are discussed below.
- Rural water supply** – One of the most demanded activities was the provision of potable water (completing at least 1,879 sub-projects as against a total target of 1,570) and consuming 14 per cent of CDF costs. This comprised the rehabilitation of hand dug wells (881 against a target of 815), the provision and rehabilitation of hand pumps and boreholes (729 against a target of 706), earth dam construction/rehabilitation (31 against a target of 14), piped extension (water reticulation) of

water supplies (172 against a target of 28) and construction and rehabilitation of small irrigation schemes (66 against a target of 7).

3. **Education and health facilities** – 26 per cent of CDF expenditure was used for health and education facilities. This included the construction/rehabilitation of schools (714 units against a target of 515), adult literacy class construction/rehabilitation (141 against a target of 121) and television centres (28 against a target of 21). While for health, the programme constructed new and rehabilitated health centres/dispensaries (452 against a target of 361), refuse, toilet and cemetery rehabilitation/construction (231 against a target of 138) as well as para-vet clinics (47 against 35).
4. **Rural access roads** – As against a target of 188 km, the programme supported the construction of 492 km of rural access roads, including the provision of culverts (136 against a target of 127) and drift/drainage construction/rehabilitation (288 against a target of 88).
5. **Skill development/marketing/processing facilities** – CBARDP increasingly supported a range of investments to focus on production and incomes. These included the construction/rehabilitation of skill development centres (92 against a target of 104) and support to demonstrate a range of other activities such as fish farms and poultry centres (134 against a target of 24), and processing facilities (milling, threshing), canoes, block making and market centres. A total of 726 units for these assets, including the physical infrastructure and equipment, were constructed as against a target of 336.
6. **Sustainable agriculture development** – Support for activities in sustainable agriculture constituted 20% of expenditures under CDF. This covered a wide set of activities - crop production, livestock and fisheries, forestry, irrigation, farm input supply and rehabilitation of degraded lands. In almost all cases, the programme exceeded its targets. Thus support to crop production was provided to 2,116 farmers as against a target of 839, livestock and poultry support to 1,519 farmers against a target of 1,001, support for forestry activities to 486 against a target of 291, and irrigation support to 506 against a target of 342. Underlying all of these activities was an expanded focus to provide better extension services to farmers through the Farmer Field School (FFS) approach, although the technical quality and regularity of these were criticised in supervision reports.⁸⁵
7. The focus on agriculture has also included the provision of inputs such as seeds and fertilisers through the establishment of rural farm input supply shops (RUFIS) (279 against a target of 186). In the area of seeds in particular, the demonstration of the relatively large scale production of quality certified seeds from producers in Yobe and Jigawa has been a notable achievement with the potential for expansion to other states.
8. **Rural enterprise and financial linkage support** - Activities for income generation through small scale enterprise development constitute the lowest level of expenditure among the four categories supported under the CDF. There were a large number of individual beneficiaries engaged in petty trading and agro-processing activities. This was followed by tailoring and knitting/embroidery (support going to 366 against a target of 403), carpentry, handicrafts and blacksmithing (360 against 253) and welding. While support for establishing links with financial institutions were provided to 272 against a target of 82, direct

⁸⁵ For example, Supervision Report, September 2011 and September 2012.

support was provided to 138 local level micro-finance institutions (FSAs). Achievements include linking the communities with both formal and non-formal financial institutions, and the PCR claimed that credit of over NGN143 million had been issued mainly from the Bank of Agriculture.

9. **Gender and vulnerable group development** – With the specific goal of support for women activities, the component has attempted to provide for a variety of interventions. The major element has been the provision of support to women for seed capital (nearly 1,700 against a target of about 1,400). The second was support for sanitation (1,197 against a target of 909), followed by support for nutrition development through the provision of complimentary direct packages (623 against a target of 267). A small number of interventions supporting nutrition and literacy development were also included as part of the package supporting gender and vulnerable group development.

Comments on CBARDP impact study

1. The surveys used different questionnaires and sampling methods. For the baseline the selection of LGAs and village areas was purposive, but how the selection of households was made is not explained. The impact study sampled all 207 village areas, but took a small sample per village areas of 25, and the sampling of these is not described. The impact study also used programme staff as enumerators rather than an independent team.
2. Neither survey presented an analysis of data quality or of statistical accuracy (such as number of error cases, level of precision of sample estimates). The baseline survey was a much shorter questionnaire than the impact study presented results mainly at state level. No explanation was given as to the exclusion of Borno State and the low sample obtained in Kebbi State. The impact study report used a data set of around half of the original sample, implying that there were considerable error levels.
3. The level of analysis is basic –only basic cross-tabulations were presented and no further explanatory analysis was done to explore differences between sub-groups such as how the marginalized or vulnerable were affected.


Comparison between baseline and impact survey samples

	<i>Baseline</i>	<i>Impact</i>
States covered	6	7
Sample per village area	200	25
Sample per state	600	675*
Total sample	3 600	5 175
Actual	3 329	2 383

* 900 for Sokoto and Katsina.


Analysis of asset sustainability

Annex VIII - Figure 1
Rating by category and state




Source: Calculated from data in annex IV – table 2.

Annex VIII - Figure 2
Rating by category and cost



Source: Calculated from data in annex IV – table 2.


Annex VIII - Figure 3
Asset rating plotted against cost



Source: Calculated from data in annex IV – table 2.


CBARDP financial performance within IFAD portfolio

Annex IX - Figure 1
Comparable disbursement rates for IFAD operations 2008-2014



Source: IFAD GRIPS; FlexCube

Annex IX - Figure 2
Sources of financing across IFAD's programmes in Nigeria




Source: IFAD GRIPS; FlexCube

Change of key poverty indicators for CBARDP states

Annex IX - Figure 1

Number of people below poverty line 2010/11 – 2012/13



Nigeria Economic Report 2014, World Bank.


Annex IX - Table 1

Comparison of severity of poverty across CBARDP states between 2003/04 and 2009/10

State	2003/04 severity of poverty	2009/10 severity of poverty
Jigawa	35.4	34.3
Yobe	22.8	24.6
Sokoto	19.1	23.8
Kano	10.6	20.4
Katsina	15.6	16.2
Zamfara	22	13.9
Kebbi	25	13.7
Borno	10.8	10.2
CBARDP average	20.2	19.6


Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Harmonized Nigeria Living Standard Note: per capita measure.

Annex IX - Figure 2
Income equality 2004-10 for CBARDP states and Kano



Poverty Profile National Bureau of Statistics 2009/10.

Annex IX - Figure 3
CBARDP states and Nigeria unemployment rates 2007-11



Source: National Bureau of Statistics Annual Abstract 2012.

Annex IX - Table 2
Per cent change in adult literacy 15+ in CBARDP states between 2005-2009

States	Per cent change between 2005 and 2009
Borno	33.8
Jigawa	17.6
Kano	10.6
Katsina	-1.5
Kebbi	15.6
Sokoto	38.3
Yobe	10.8
Zamfara	55.1
CBARDP average	22.5

Source: National Bureau of Statistics

Methodological note on project performance assessments


A. What is a project performance assessment?¹

1. The project performance assessment (PPA) conducted by the Independent Office of Evaluation of IFAD (IOE) entails one mission of 7-10 days² and two mission members³. PPAs are conducted on a sample of projects for which project completion reports have been validated by IOE, and take account of the following criteria (not mutually exclusive): (i) synergies with forthcoming or ongoing IOE evaluations (e.g. country programme or corporate-level evaluations); (ii) major information gaps in project completion reports (PCRs); (iii) novel approaches; and (iv) geographic balance.
2. The objectives of the PPA are to: assess the results and impact of the project under consideration; and (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in the country involved. When the PPA is to be used as an input for a country programme evaluation, this should be reflected at the beginning of the report. The PPA is based on the PCR/V results, further desk review, interviews at IFAD headquarters, and a dedicated mission to the country, to include meetings in the capital city and field visits. The scope of the PPA is set out in the respective terms of reference.

B. Preparing a PPA

3. Based on the results of the PCR/V, IOE prepares brief terms of reference (ToR) for the PPA in order to sharpen the focus of the exercise.⁴ As in the case of PCR/Vs, PPAs do not attempt to respond to each and every question contained in the Evaluation Manual. Instead, they concentrate on the most salient facets of the criteria calling for PPA analysis, especially those not adequately explained in the PCR/V.
4. When preparing a PPA, the emphasis placed on each evaluation criterion will depend both on the PCR/V assessment and on findings that emerge during the PPA process. When a criterion or issue is not identified as problematic or in need of further investigation, and no additional information or evidence emerges during the PPA process, the PPA report will re-elaborate the PCR/V findings.

Scope of the PPA



¹ Extract from the PCR/V and PPA Guidelines.

² PPAs are to be conducted within a budget ceiling of US\$25,000.

³ Typically, a PPA mission would be conducted by an IOE staff member with the support of a consultant (international or national). An additional (national) consultant may be recruited if required and feasible within the evaluation budget.

⁴ Rather than an approach paper, IOE prepares terms of reference for PPAs. These terms of reference ensure coverage of information gaps, areas of focus identified through PCR/Vs and comments by the country programme manager, and will concentrate the PPA on those areas. The terms of reference will be included as an annex to the PPA.

C. Evaluation criteria

5. The PPA is well suited to provide an informed summary assessment of project relevance. This includes assessing the relevance of project objectives and of design. While, at the design stage, project logical frameworks are sometimes succinct and sketchy, they do contain a number of (tacit) assumptions on mechanisms and processes expected to generate the final results. At the post-completion phase, and with the benefit of hindsight, it will be clearer to the evaluators which of these assumptions have proved to be realistic, and which did not hold up during implementation and why.
6. For example, the PPA of a project with a major agricultural marketing component may consider whether the project framework incorporated key information on the value chain. Did it investigate issues relating to input and output markets (distance, information, monopolistic power)? Did it make realistic assumptions on post-harvest conservation and losses? In such cases, staff responsible for the PPA will not be expected to conduct extensive market analyses, but might consider the different steps (e.g. production, processing, transportation, distribution, retail) involved and conduct interviews with selected actors along the value chain.
7. An assessment of effectiveness, the extent to which a project's overall objectives have been achieved, should be preferably made at project completion, when the components are expected to have been executed and all resources fully utilized. The PPA considers the overall objectives⁵ set out in the final project design document and as modified during implementation. At the same time, it should be flexible enough to capture good performance or under-performance in areas that were not defined as an objective in the initial design but emerged during the course of implementation.
8. The PPA mission may interview farmers regarding an extension component, the objective of which was to diffuse a certain agricultural practice (say, adoption of a soil nutrient conservation technique). The purpose here would be to understand whether the farmers found it useful, to what extent they applied it and their perception of the results obtained. The PPA may look into reasons for the farmers' interest in new techniques, and into adoption rates. For example, was the extension message delivered through lectures? Did extension agents use audio-visual tools? Did extension agents engage farmers in interactive and participatory modules? These type of questions help illustrate *why* certain initiatives have been conducive (or not conducive) to obtaining the desired results.
9. The Evaluation Manual suggests methods for assessing efficiency, such as calculating the economic internal rate of return (EIRR),⁶ estimating unit costs and comparing them with standards (cost-effectiveness approach), or addressing managerial aspects of efficiency (timely delivery of activities, respect of budget provisions). The documentation used in preparing the PCRV should normally provide sufficient evidence of delays and cost overruns and make it possible to explain why they happened.
10. As far as rural poverty impact is concerned, the following domains are contemplated in the Evaluation Manual: (a) household income and assets;

⁵ Overall objectives will be considered as a reference for assessing effectiveness. However, these are not always stated clearly or consistent throughout the documentation. The assessment may be made by component if objectives are defined by components; however the evaluation will try to establish a correspondence between the overall objectives and outputs.

⁶ Calculating an EIRR may be challenging for a PPA as it is time consuming and the required high quality data are often not available. The PPA may help verify whether some of the crucial assumptions for EIRR calculation are consistent with field observations. The mission may also help shed light on the cost-effectiveness aspects of efficiency, for example whether, in an irrigation project, a simple upgrade of traditional seasonal flood water canalization systems might have been an option, rather than investing on a complex irrigation system, when access to markets is seriously constrained.

- (b) human and social capital and empowerment; (c) food security and agricultural productivity; (d) natural resources, the environment and climate change;⁷ and (e) institutions and policies. As shown in past evaluations, IFAD-funded projects generally collect very little data on household or community-level impact indicators. Even when impact data are available, both their quality and the methodological rigour of impact assessments are still questionable. For example, although data report significant increases in household assets, these may be due to exogenous factors (e.g. falling prices of certain commodities; a general economic upturn; households receiving remittances), and not to the project.
11. PPAs may help address the “attribution issue” (i.e. establishing to what extent certain results are due to a development intervention rather than to exogenous factors) by:
 - (i) following the logical chain of the project, identifying key hypotheses and reassessing the plausibility chain; and
 - (ii) conducting interviews with non-beneficiaries sharing key characteristics (e.g. socio-economic status, livelihood, farming system), which would give the mission an idea of what would have happened without the project (counterfactual).⁸
 12. When sufficient resources are available, simple data collection exercises (mini-surveys) may be conducted by a local consultant prior to the PPA mission.⁹ Another non-mutually exclusive option is to spot-check typical data ranges or patterns described in the PCR by means of case studies (e.g. do PCR claims regarding increases in average food-secure months fall within the typical ranges recorded in the field?). It is to be noted that, while data collected by a PPA mission may not be representative in a statistical sense, such data often provide useful reference points and insights. It is important to exercise care in selecting sites for interviews in order to avoid blatant cases of non-beneficiaries profiting from the project.). Sites for field visits are selected by IOE in consultation with the government concerned. Government staff may also accompany the PPA mission on these visits.
 13. The typical timing of the PPA (1-2 years after project closure) may be useful for identifying factors that enhance or threaten the sustainability of benefits. By that stage, the project management unit may have been disbanded and some of the support activities (technical, financial, organizational) terminated, unless a second phase is going forward or other funding has become available. Typical factors of sustainability (political support, availability of budgetary resources for maintenance, technical capacity, commitment, ownership by the beneficiaries, environmental resilience) can be better understood at the ex post stage.
 14. The PPA also concentrates on IFAD’s role with regard to the promotion of innovations and scaling up. For example, it might be observed that some innovations are easily scaled up at low cost (e.g. simple but improved cattle-rearing practices that can be disseminated with limited funding). In other cases, scaling up may involve risks: consider the case of a high-yield crop variety for which market demand is static. Broad adoption of the variety may be beneficial in terms of ensuring food security, but may also depress market prices and thereby reduce sale revenues for many households unless there are other, complementary activities for the processing of raw products.
 15. The PPA addresses gender equality and women’s empowerment, a criterion recently introduced into IFAD’s evaluation methodology. This relates to the

⁷ Climate change criterion will be addressed if and when pertinent in the context of the project, as most completed projects evaluated did not integrate this issue into the project design.

⁸ See also the discussion of attribution issues in the section on PCRVs.

⁹ If the PPA is conducted in the context of a country programme evaluation, then the PPA can piggy-back on the CPE and dedicate more resources to primary data collection.

emphasis placed on gender issues: whether it has been followed up during implementation, including the monitoring of gender-related indicators; and the results achieved.

16. Information from the PCRV may be often sufficient to assess the performance of partners, namely, IFAD and the government. The PPA mission may provide further insights, such as on IFAD's responsiveness, if relevant, to implementation issues or problems of coordination among the project implementation unit and local and central governments. The PPA does not assess the performance of cooperating institutions, which now has little or no learning value for IFAD.
17. Having completed the analysis, the PPA provides its own ratings in accordance with the evaluation criteria and compares them with PMD's ratings. PPA ratings are final for evaluation reporting purposes. The PPA also rates the quality of the PCR document.
18. The PPA formulates short conclusions: a storyline of the main findings. Thereafter, a few key recommendations are presented with a view to following up projects, or other interventions with a similar focus or components in different areas of the country.¹⁰

¹⁰ Practices differ among multilateral development banks, including recommendations in PPAs. At the World Bank, there are no recommendations but "lessons learned" are presented in a typical PPA. On the other hand, PPAs prepared by Asian Development Bank include "issues and lessons" as well as "follow-up actions" although the latter tend to take the form of either generic technical guidelines for a future (hypothetical) intervention in the same sector or for an ongoing follow-up project (at Asian Development Bank, PPAs are undertaken at least three years after project closure).

Approach paper

I. Background and introduction

A. Project Performance Assessment (PPA)

1. In line with the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) Evaluation Policy¹ and as approved by the 113th Session of the IFAD Executive Board, the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) will undertake Project Performance Assessment (PPA) of the IFAD-financed Community-based Agricultural and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP) in Nigeria. The main purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results and impact of the CBARDP and generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in Nigeria.
2. This Approach Paper presents the overall design of the CBARDP project performance assessment. It contains a summary of background information on the country and the project being evaluated. The paper outlines the evaluation objectives, methodology, process and timeframe. The Evaluation Framework presented in annex II provides a summary of the evaluation criteria and the key questions that will be used in conducting this evaluation.
3. The Project Performance Assessment (PPA) of the CBARDP will provide an input into the Nigeria CPE which will commence in April 2015.² While the CPE will be covering all operations that have been active under the current COSOP, the PPA of the CBARDP will enable a more detailed analysis of one of the main IFAD operations in Nigeria: CBARDP ran for 10 years (2003-2013), spanned two COSOPs, and was the largest of the completed operations in the Nigeria portfolio (financed with US\$72.5 million IFAD loan).
4. In preparation for the PPA, IOE has reviewed the PCR CBARDP by means of a project completion report validations (PCR/V). The following PPA will provide a detailed and independent assessment of the project results and lessons learned. It will build on the information included in the PCR but “fill major information gaps, address inconsistencies and analytical weaknesses of PCRs and further validate the explanations, conclusions and lesson presented in PCRs, including identification of causes of good or poor performance”.³ The PPA will benefit from a field visit in addition to a desk review, so that additional data can be collected and stakeholders interviewed.⁴

B. Country and project background

5. Nigeria’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is now the largest in Africa, having overtaken South Africa in 2014.⁵ GDP growth rates have been relatively stable and robust, on average 5.9 per cent since 2007. The economy has grown by an average of 4.9% in the period between 2010 and 2013.⁶ Economic growth has been mainly driven by rising global oil prices.
6. The government has recognised the need to diversify its growth; non-oil GDP growth has been higher than GDP growth driven solely by oil. Agriculture is among the largest sector in the Nigerian economy, contributing to 22% of the GDP in

¹ IFAD (2011) Evaluation Policy.

² A separate approach paper for the CPE will be available before the preparatory mission in April.

³ Draft PCR/V – PPA guidance (from the revised IOE Manual 2014), Para 7.

⁴ The fieldwork to the project area (northern Nigeria) may be restricted due to security concerns.

⁵ This has mainly to do with the fact that in 2014 the National Bureau of Statistics had changed the way GDP was calculated. The adjusted GDP puts Nigeria at US\$510 billion, putting it ahead of South Africa (US\$380 billion). <http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21600734-revised-figures-show-nigeria-africas-largest-economy-step-change>.

⁶ World Bank Economic Indicators Database, 2014.

- 2012.⁷ Over 70 per cent of the rural population in agriculture are smallholders with production primarily oriented towards meeting subsistence needs. On average, smallholder farmers cultivate below 2 ha of land and grow their crops mainly for household consumption. Productivity is low due to the lack of modernization and poor access to inputs and credit.
7. Nigeria is presently one of the world's largest food importers. In 2014, Nigeria imported 3.8 million tonnes out of 3.9 million tonnes of wheat consumed, and it imported 2.9 million tonnes of Rice out of 5.7 million tonnes.⁸ High dependence on food imports has made the country vulnerable to global price fluctuations.
 8. Nigeria's population of 168 million is growing at 3 per cent per year. With regard to human development, Nigeria's ranks 152 out of 187 countries in 2013.⁹ Poverty rates in Nigeria have slightly fallen from 35.2 per cent in 2009/2010 to 33.1 percent in 2012/2013 as a result of the higher GDP per capita. However, the poverty-reducing benefits from growth have to some extent been offset by a sharp increase in inequality. New estimates suggest a strong divide between the north and the south of Nigeria, and also between urban and rural areas. Fifty-two per cent of the poor are living in the North East.¹⁰ The current deterioration or stagnation in poverty and poverty reduction in the North East and North West is most likely related to the security situation.
 9. Nigeria is facing astronomical growth in unemployment, particularly amongst the youth. In the last ten years, approximately 20 million youth entered the country's labour market; an estimated 56 per cent of youth remain unemployed (International Labour Organization data).¹¹ The main reason why unemployment is high despite high economic growth is that the country's oil industry is not a major source of employment.¹²
 10. Government adopted two policy documents guiding rural development and agricultural growth. The Vision 20:20 lays the overarching policy framework for Nigeria to become one of the top 20 economies in the world by year 2020. The Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) strives to "achieve a hunger-free Nigeria through an agricultural sector that drives income growth, accelerates achievement of food and nutritional security, generates employment, and transforms Nigeria into a leading player in global food markets". The goals of ATA are to increase demand for Nigeria's food staple crops by 20 million metric tons and create 3.5 million jobs in agriculture by 2015.
 11. Nigeria has a decentralized federal system of government comprising a federal capital territory, 36 states and 774 local government areas (LGAs). Nigerian states operate with a high degree of legal and de facto autonomy. The federal structure implies a complex fiscal system, which requires many extra-budgetary funds. All oil and gas revenue and most of non-oil revenues are pooled and shared by the three tiers of government.¹³

⁷ World Bank Economic Indicators Database, 2014.

⁸ These numbers are up significantly compared to 2010, where Nigeria imported 0.9 million tonnes of rice and 1.1 million tonnes of wheat, while producing 4.4 million tonnes of rice and 0.03 million tonnes of wheat (FAO Database, FAO Cereal Supply/Demand Balance for Sub-Saharan Africa).

⁹ The country's HDI of 0.504 is only just above the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. However, when the value is discounted for inequality, the HDI falls below the Sub-Saharan average (0.300 compared to 0.334) (UNDP. Human Development Report 2014).

¹⁰ Data from the recent GHS (2012/2013). World Bank, Nigeria Economy Report July 2014

¹¹ Samuels, Fiona et al. (2011). Food, finance and fuel: the impacts of the triple F crisis in Nigeria, with a particular focus on women and children. ODI Background Note, October 2011.

¹² Ogbu, Osita (2012). Toward inclusive growth in Nigeria. The Brookings Institution: Policy Paper 2012-4.

¹³ The sharing formula prescribed by a constitutionally created body, Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC). Thirteen per cent (13per cent) of the oil and gas revenue is allocated to the oil producing areas and the remainder is shared out as follows: federal government (52.7per cent), state governments (26.7 per cent) and local governments (20.6per cent). Economic governance and institutional capacity are still weak at the federal level and particularly more so at the state levels.

12. The country's political landscape is split between the mainly Muslim North and the primarily Christian South. Large parts of the country have been affected by conflict, although violence has varied across space and over time. Nigeria's death toll from acts of armed violence has been on a sharp increase since 2010. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. Poverty is seen as the root cause of violence and anger in both the North and South. Income shocks and rising fuel prices have aggravated the situation. There is also a close correlation between youth unemployment and rising armed violence.¹⁴ Large parts of the CBARDP project area in the North East of the Country have seen an escalating conflict and large numbers of displaced people as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency in recent years.

C. IFAD's position and role within the Nigerian context

13. Nigeria is the largest recipient of ODA in West Africa. In 2013, Nigeria received US\$2,515 million of ODA. However development aid only constituted 1 per cent of the GNI (OECD DAC data). Furthermore, funding from the private sector has become a more important source of finance; in 2013 more than 50 per cent of the financial flows were non-ODA (OECD DAC data). ODA remains an important source of funding within the social sectors, particularly for the lower tiers of government.
14. IFAD's support represents a very small proportion of this. In 2012, IFAD provided US\$13 million (according to OECD DAC data). IFAD involvement in Nigeria began in 1985. According to the first COSOP 1 (2001-2010) IFAD's programmes should be community-based demand-driven and flexible, follow a more decentralized process, enhance the resource base of the rural poor, follow a market-led approach to services, and aim for a broader national coverage. For IFAD, the involvement in Nigeria is significant. In 2014 Nigeria had the largest portfolio in West and Central Africa Division of IFAD (WCA) (12.4 per cent), the second largest in the Africa Region (2.3 per cent of total IFAD as of June 2014) for a total amount of US\$347.5 million (active and closed portfolio). The average amount per loan is the highest within the WCA and the Africa portfolio (US\$ 24.20 million compared to the average of US\$13.70 for the WCA region and 12.20 for IFAD average).¹⁵

D. The CBARD programme

15. The CBARDP programme was aligned with the **Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA)** and **Vision 2020**, the two main Government of Nigeria documents outlining Government policy towards agriculture and rural development. The ATA is characterized by its private sector approach to agricultural development, its cluster approach and its focus on innovative financing for agriculture.
16. CBRDP operated in the most deprived states in the North and North East of Nigeria. It aimed at improving the livelihoods and living conditions of rural communities and households in the seven states of Borno, Jigava, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. CBARDP covered 207 villages across 69 Local Government Areas. The programme was a follow-up to the earlier state-level community development programs for Sokoto and Katsina. It used a Community Driven Development (CDD) approach – targeting the rural poor with special emphasis on women, vulnerable groups and livelihood support both for on-farm and off farm activities
17. The programme used a decentralized village level planning and community based implementation at a time (in the early 2000s) where previous military governments had weakened local and decentralized structures. At the national level, overall programme oversight was carried out by the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and

¹⁴ Babatounde Abidoye and Massimiliano Cali. 2014. Income shocks and conflict: evidence from Nigeria (World Bank). Alozieuwa, Simeon. 2012. Contending theories on Nigeria's security Challenge in the Era of Boko Haram Insurgency Peace & Conflict Review Volume 7, Issue 1.); NRSP . 2014. WINNERS OR LOSERS? Assessing the Contribution of Youth Employment. International Alert and Empowerment Programmes to Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria.

¹⁵ Country Summary Sheet (July 2013-June 2014).

Rural Development. The Programme Support Office (PSO) in Katsina provided technical assistance support, coordination and monitoring assistance. State-level oversight was coordinated through the Agriculture and Rural Development Executive Committee for each state composed of the commissioners of the relevant line agencies and representative of the participating local government councils. There was an SSO in each participating state, responsible for programme implementation on behalf of state implementing ministries.

18. The project purpose was (i) to empower rural women and men to effectively manage their own development, (ii) support institutionalization of programmes and processes, create awareness and develop the capacity of public and private service providers to become more relevant and responsive to rural women and men and (iii) support balanced sustainable social agricultural and economic development. The project consisted of two operational components and a management and coordination component. Component 1 was on awareness and capacity-building; Component 2 included a Community Development Fund for communal infrastructure, gender and vulnerable groups' development, rural enterprise development and financial linkage support, and sustainable agricultural development.

Annex XII - Table 1

CBARDP basic data at approval and completion

	<i>Approval (US\$ million)</i>		<i>Actual (US\$ million)</i>	
Total project costs		65.4		81.5
IFAD loan and percentage of total	29.9	45.72%	42.9	52.64%
Borrower (federal level)	2.9	4.57%	2.9	
State-level cofinancing	5.2	8.41%	5.2	
Local govt. cofinancing	23.4	35.78%	23.4	
Other sources: technical assistance grant	3.0			Not received
Number of beneficiaries		2 800 000		1 207 909

19. CBARDP became effective in 2003 and was closed in 2013. In the end it has reached a lower number beneficiaries at significantly higher costs than anticipated at the time of approval. The costs per beneficiary increase from US\$ 36.0 at appraisal to US\$ 89.0 at completion. In the end, IFAD contributed a higher part (52.64per cent) than planned to the programme funding by means of a project amendment.¹⁶ Local government cofinancing constituted the highest share of counterpart funding.
20. The PCR ratings were moderately satisfactory (4) for relevance, satisfactory (5) for effectiveness, and moderately satisfactory (4) for efficiency. Poverty impact is rated between 4 and 6 for the different domains. A major limitation for the PCR was that the available information from the M&E system only covered routine monitoring and financial aspects and provided hardly any data on project outcomes. Without evidence, IOE ratings (through the PCRv) were lower on several evaluation criteria.

¹⁶ Total programme costs were quoted as US\$68.5m in the appraisal report. This included a US\$3m TA grant provision that did not materialize. Total programme costs then increased because of US\$13m of additional financing from IFAD when CBARBD was extended and re-designed in 2010.

Annex XII - Table 2
CBARDP performance ratings

<i>Evaluation criteria</i>	<i>PCR rating</i>	<i>IOE rating</i>
Relevance	4	4
Effectiveness	5	4
Efficiency	4	3
Rural poverty impact	4.33	3.67
Sustainability	4	3
Innovation and scaling up	5	4
Gender equality and women's empowerment	5	5
<i>Performance of partners</i>		
IFAD	4	4
Government	3	3
CDAs and Apex organizations	4	4

II. Evaluation objectives and scope

21. **The objectives of the PPA** are to: (i) assess the results and impact of the CBARDP; (ii) generate findings and recommendations for the design and implementation of ongoing and future operations in Nigeria; and (iii) provide a deeper understanding of one of the most significant operations of IFAD within the COSOP period (2010-2015) as an input into the upcoming CPE.
22. The **scope** of the PPA has been identified based on the following criteria: (i) Areas identified in the PCR where little evidence is available to substantiate PMD ratings (e.g. effectiveness and sustainability criteria) – the PPA will review additional evidence and propose a complete list of consolidated ratings; (ii) selected issues of strategic importance for IFAD in Nigeria – PPA analysis will feed into the upcoming CPE and the following COSOP preparation; and (iii) limitations set by the available time and budget – the PPA will have to be selective in focussing on key issues where value can be added, given the limited time and budget.
23. The PPA will use the standard IOE criteria plus selected key issues developed for this particular exercise, as stipulated by the applicable IOE guidance.¹⁷ The following paragraphs provide an overview on the key issues and questions that will be addressed by the PPA. The detailed evaluation questions are included in annex II.
24. **Relevance:** PCR and PCRV have covered aspects of relevance extensively. Therefore the PPA will mainly focus on the key gaps identified with regard to funding and over-flexible choice of investments. The PPA will assess the appropriateness of the CDD design and the implications that the wide geographical coverage and flexibility of project design had for the achievement of project objectives.
25. **Effectiveness** of the CBARDP is one of the areas into which the PPA will look in greater detail. Project outreach was far off target; only 43% of the targeted population had been reached. However, the PCR noted positive achievements with regard to capacity building, jobs creation and enterprises development. At the same time, the PCRV pointed out the lack of reliable outcome data as a major gap in the PCR. The PPA will review the existing evidence base to establish the results

¹⁷ Draft PCR – PPA guidance (from the revised IOE Manual 2014), para. 7.

achieved by CBARDP and conduct further analysis on how and why project activities have achieved the intended results.

26. **Efficiency** is another major area of focus, and this is mainly related to issues of programme management. Delays in the release of funding, the complex managerial set-up of programme management and the huge geographical coverage all have affected the efficiency of the programme and will deserve further analysis during the PPA. Disbursements started slow but, after an extension of 3 years, reached a level of 99 per cent in the end. The difficulties in mobilising substantial counterpart funding and the significantly higher than expected costs are areas of concern.
27. **Impact** is probably the most difficult area to establish; nevertheless the available programme documentation includes extensive claims on the impact achieved. But the evidence to justify these claims (and the subsequent ratings) tends to be rather weak – as noted by the PCR. The most significant impact ascribed to CBARDP – according to the PCR – are the institutional changes effected through CDAs – a new 4th tier of government – as well as through financial service associations (FSAs). Issues of the institutional impact and sustainability of community organizations will be one of the PPA themes. The PPA will examine whether the creation of these community-level organizations resulted in better service delivery and empowerment of remote villages. The PPA will also review the existing evidence base and whether it supports the substantial increases of assets, productivity, incomes and food security reported in the PCR.
28. **Sustainability**: A major question raised by the PCR was the sustainability of the CDD approach and the newly created community-level – 4th tier of government – organizations. Two years after project closure, the PPA will provide a good opportunity to revisit some of the project sites and assess whether these institutions (CDAs, FSAs) have been maintained or replicated. Furthermore, the PPA will look for evidence that the CDD approach and the microfinance approach has been copied by others. The factors affecting sustainability (e.g. security, political interference) will also be examined.
29. **Gender equality and women’s empowerment**: The program’s gender outcomes have been rated very positively. The PCR claims that 41 per cent of the beneficiaries were female and the PPA would need to verify this figure. Because **youth** is an important theme in CBARDP and the rest of the Nigeria portfolio, this will be treated within this criterion from a gender perspective. Youth will also be considered in other relevant evaluation criteria, such as impact. The PPA would assess which mechanisms have been most effective in supporting the particular interest and constraints of women and youth.
30. **Innovation and scaling up**: The programme introduced a number of technical and institutional innovations which appear to have been well received. The introduction of CDAs and FSAs is seen as the most significant and sustainable innovation according to the PCR. The extent to which these institutional innovations have been scaled-up – both within the IFAD portfolio and outside by government, private sector and other development partners will be a question for the PPA.
31. **Performance of partners**: The PCR has named government performance as a key factor that has hampered progress. The PPA will look at selected issues which have affected the performance of IFAD and government partners. For IFAD, the key question will be whether the rating system has provided a reliable base for tracking CBARDP’s progress. For Government, the PPA will identify the key factors that have led to the delay and limited government contribution to the programme and eventually forced IFAD to take over a higher than anticipated share of the costs in order to ensure that the program’s objectives would be achieved.

III. Key issues for further analysis

32. IOE has conducted a preliminary review of the PCR and the available documentation to identify key CBARDP issues which are also of strategic importance for the rest of the Nigeria portfolio. These issues include (i) the benefits of the CDD approach, the institutional effectiveness and sustainability of community level institutions, and the willingness of the government to sustain and further scale up CBARDP's CDD approach; (ii) the failure of program's M&E system to provide timely and reliable evidence on programme performance and outcomes; and (iii) the highly decentralised and flexible approach to programme design and management, and the extent to which it enabled or hampered programme progress and results.
33. **Community Driven Development (CDD):** The CDD approach probably was the most characteristic feature of CBARDP. It has added to the complexity of the programme approach, but allegedly has been very effective in strengthening capacities and social capital at the community level. The PCR even reports evidence of CDD approaches being copied in northern states. The PPA will investigate how the CDD approach has strengthened the interaction between communities and local groups on the one side and local government and service providers on the other. The PPA will take a sample of stakeholder groups to gain insights into how communities have taken responsibility or are holding service providers to account.
34. **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E):** The issue of weak evidence on project outcomes and/or M&E data has been highlighted by the PCR. The issue of why M&E systems did not respond satisfactorily to the challenge of capturing project results and impacts will therefore be a major theme for this PPA.
35. **Programme management:** The decentralized structure for CBARDP implementation meant that the programme had to be adjusted to different state level administration, local governments and its regulations and consequently, highly different institutional and local policy structures. Under the two components, village needs and requirements were captured through participatory appraisals and carried out by more than 200 newly formed Community Development Associations (CDAs). In practice this led the project implementation process to being very adaptive and both activities the results showing a great degree of variation across the different locations. The PPA will assess the challenges related to this management approach and to what extent they affected the effectiveness and efficiency of this programme.
36. These three issues describe the thematic focus of the PPA. In the report, they will be treated in some depth under the different evaluation criteria. The conclusions and recommendations will specifically address these three issues.

IV. Analytical framework and methodology

37. The methodological approach to providing credible findings through the PPA will be to (a) close the existing evidence gaps and (b) establish plausible causal links between CBARDP interventions and the observed changes. The PPA will use a theory of change for a systematic examination of assumed causal linkages and whether there is sufficient evidence to support these linkages. The PPA will collect and analyse data from different sources, to cross-check, validate and supplement the findings presented in the PCR.
38. The intended **impact pathway** for CBARDP was that the programme will create the assets and institutions at community level which will support sustainable livelihoods and greater institutional stability in the longer term. The newly created community-level organizations are the key link in the assumed impact pathway. They provide better extension services (public and private), training on financial services, links established between producers and buyers, and increased outreach

of micro finance. At household level this will enable increased *incomes* through production changes based on improved use of technology, access to finance, land area increase, less waste, market linkages, dry season farming and off farm jobs. Second, *food security* will be improved through seeds and other technology for staple crops and also livestock breed improvement under CBARDP. The draft TOC is included in annex 1.¹⁸

39. **Sampling approach:** CBARDP has been implemented in 7 northern states and 69 LGAs. Ideally, the PPA should cover all states through key informant interviews and conduct field visits to a representative sample of states and LGAs. However in addition to the limited time and budget, the security situation in northern Nigeria will restrict access to the field.¹⁹ Limited access to the field introduces a potential bias which the PPA will have to be conscious to address. Improved outreach and coverage of a larger sample of states will be achieved through phone interviews and possibly (ex situ) meetings with a larger number of former project staff in secure location(s).

V. Data collection methods

40. Careful analysis and triangulation of reported programme achievements will be a key feature of this PPA. Validation of programme results will be done through bringing in and cross-checking multiple stakeholder perspectives, data sources as well as findings across the evaluation team.
41. IFAD's internal documentary is extensive, and at programme level includes the Countries Strategic Opportunities Paper (COSOP), a COSOP Mid Term Review, and COSOP Annual Impact Reviews (AIRs). For individual projects, both active and completed, the reports include annual Project Status Reports (along with PSR ratings presented in the divisional Annual Portfolio Review), Mid-term Reviews (MTR), Supervision Reports, and a Project Completion Report (PCR) prepared at the end of a project jointly with the government, which also includes a set of ratings (PCR ratings). The Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) it includes a menu of indicators used to measure and report on the performance of IFAD projects – at activity, output and impact level. In addition, government statistics, external studies and reports will be used to the extent possible. Reliable statistics are hard to come by in Nigeria though.²⁰
42. The programme M&E does not provide all the data that will be required. After what appears to have been a fairly thorough M&E design, the actual implementation of the M&E system failed to deliver reliable information on outcomes and impacts. There are plenty of output level results from the various progress reports, like training given, groups formed, provision of credit and distribution of inputs come from routine monitoring and progress reports. But results at outcome/purpose level, such as productivity changes, income changes, volume of good marketed and so on, are not well captured or if they are, the basis for their calculation is not always clear.²¹
43. The following strategies for data collection, including the opportunity to undertake limited fieldwork are proposed:

¹⁸ The reason for having a visual presentation of the assumed TOC is also that this will provide a useful base for interactive discussions with project management during the PPA.

¹⁹ At the moment, only two states (Kebbi and Sokoto) are suggested by the Country Programme Manager as safe to visit.

²⁰ For example, in agriculture the COSOP Annual Impact Reviews review noted that most states could not provide reliable crop production data from 2005-13.

²¹ For example in the COSOP MTR, figures are quoted for yield and production levels of cassava, sorghum, rice, fish etc. (para 23) but no sources are provided for these estimates. Appendix 3 of the MTR says: "It is more due to lack of reporting rather than lack of progress that we are not able to give strong figures. M&E from the programmes need to be able to measure for outcomes and the updated MRF indicators."

- An analysis of all relevant IFAD documentation will be the first step in verifying the consistency of findings and availability of data at different levels in the results hierarchy. An extensive set of COSOP, loan and grant reports will be examined in a structured way to address issues identified in the PPA/CPE approach papers.
 - CBARDP documentation has already assembled, will be collated and analysed to supplement and provide richer data. These should include progress reports, studies and surveys, and grant reports.
 - Any existing baseline and impact reports for CBARDP that provided the evidence for the PCRs.
 - Secondary data at national, state and local government level, or from businesses or traders, will supplement the above and substantiate indirectly the achievements of IFAD's projects. Especially at goal and purpose level, national surveys typically provide the means of validation for. As part of the PPA fieldwork, a visit to the National Bureau of Statistics in Abuja will help to check the latest statistical data and to affirm the revised poverty figures.
 - Key informant interviews will be very important to explore a number of issues, including: the existence of additional reports or surveys, exploring the justifications for ratings in PCR or supervisions, and to understand the evidence base for the ratings and judgements given in the various performance reports. Interviews would need to be conducted with IFAD, Government of Nigeria representatives (federal, state and LGA level), non-governmental organizations and private sector actors involved in the various projects, beneficiaries and other development partners (World Bank, Department for International Development [United Kingdom], United States Agency International Development). Consultants and IFAD staff involved in previous reviews or PCRs would be valuable sources of evidence. As part of the PPA preparation an inventory of such key informants will be prepared.
 - Additional primary data collection: The PPA will use a team of two local consultants to provide further analysis on selected issues, based on some engagement with project staff and communities in the field. (if found). Using carefully prepared group and sub-group interviews is important in order to obtain views of different categories of beneficiary. Purposive sampling and case studies from the field will be most applicable to cross-check PCR findings. This will include re-analysis and field validation of the CBARDP PCR's impact study.
44. The PPA methodology is closely linked with that of the upcoming CPE. Firstly, it will be possible through the PPA exercise to gain an appreciation of data quality from the various sources identified above, in order to determine the best and most efficient sources for the subsequent CPE. Where reliable data sources are found, such as national surveys or studies by other development partners, these may be carried across for use in the CPE. Secondly, a number of PPA questions will also be addressed by the CPE which allows findings from the PPA to inform the CPE. In this sense, the PPA will provide a preliminary case study for the CPE.

VI. Evaluation team

45. Lead Evaluator for this PPA will be Johanna Pennarz, Lead Evaluation Specialist in IOE. She will be supported by other IOE staff, including Alejandro Yeves Di Carlo (Research Analyst) and Maria Cristina Spagnolo (Evaluation Assistant). IOE has appointed Nicholas Chapman as senior consultant for this assignment. He will be supported by two Nigeria-based consultants, including an M&E specialist/economist and a CDD specialist, who will also work on the upcoming CPE.

VII. Process and timeline

46. The PPA process has been designed in a way to enable cross-over linkages with the ongoing CPE and to maximise stakeholder participation and learning.
47. **Preparation:** The PPA approach paper, including the evaluation framework and the draft theory of change (TOC) will be shared with WCA, the country office and Government in February. During the preparation phase, the research analyst will collate the complete project documentation on dropbox and assemble a list of former project staff and other stakeholders to be contacted by the team.
48. **Desk review:** The evaluation team will conduct a desk review of the available project documentation as well as relevant studies, surveys or other background information prior to the main country mission in March. Also, the team will prepare the detailed field methodology and start conducting phone interviews with former project staff and other relevant stakeholders during this phase.
49. **Field work:** The field work phase in March will include a "mini survey" to be undertaken by the Nigerian consultants among previous project staff and selected CDAs, FSAs and groups of beneficiaries. The actual field study in the northern states will be done in early April, to allow the situation to settle after the elections in February.
50. **Country mission:** The PPA country visit by the Lead Evaluator together with the Senior Consultant in April will include additional field visits for crosschecking and validation. A debriefing will be held with Government authorities and the Country Programme Manager for Nigeria will also attend the discussions.
51. **Report drafting and peer review:** The Senior Consultant will submit the draft PPA report to the Lead Evaluator for finalization and peer review in May.
52. **Comments by WCA and Government:** The draft PPA report will be available for comments by WCA, country office and Government in June.
53. **In country learning event:** During the main CPE mission in July, there will be a learning event where the PPA findings will be presented to Government and IFAD. The discussions around selected PPA issues will also inform the CPE.
54. **Communication and dissemination:** The final report will be disseminated among key stakeholders and the evaluation report published by IOE, both online and in print. IFAD Management will prepare a written response on the final evaluation report, which will be included in the published version of the document. The recommendations addressed to IFAD will be followed up in the President's Report on the Implementation Status and Management Actions (PRISMA) of Evaluation Recommendations.
55. The IOE team is in close contact with the IFAD country office in planning the country visit and field work. Due to the uncertain security situation it may become necessary to adjust process and timeline.


Definition of the evaluation criteria used by IOE

<i>Criteria</i>	<i>Definition^a</i>
Project performance	
Relevance	The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries' requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design in achieving its objectives.
Effectiveness	The extent to which the development intervention's objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
Efficiency	A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
Rural poverty impact^b	Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
Household income and assets	Household income provides a means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value.
Human and social capital and empowerment	Human and social capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grassroots organizations and institutions, and the poor's individual and collective capacity.
Food security and agricultural productivity	Changes in food security relate to availability, access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields.
Natural resources, the environment and climate change	The focus on natural resources and the environment involves assessing the extent to which a project contributes to changes in the protection, rehabilitation or depletion of natural resources and the environment as well as in mitigating the negative impact of climate change or promoting adaptation measures.
Institutions and policies	The criterion relating to institutions and policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
Other performance criteria	
Sustainability	The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project's life.
Innovation and scaling up	The extent to which IFAD development interventions have: (i) introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction; and (ii) the extent to which these interventions have been (or are likely to be) replicated and scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
Gender equality and women's empowerment	The criterion assesses the efforts made to promote gender equality and women's empowerment in the design, implementation, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation of IFAD-assisted projects.
Overall project achievement	This provides an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon the analysis made under the various evaluation criteria cited above.
Performance of partners	This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation.
IFAD	It also assesses the performance of individual partners against their expected role and responsibilities in the project life cycle.
Government	

^a These definitions have been taken from the OECD/DAC *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management* and from the IFAD Evaluation Manual (2009).

^b The IFAD Evaluation Manual also deals with the "lack of intervention", that is, no specific intervention may have been foreseen or intended with respect to one or more of the five impact domains. In spite of this, if positive or negative changes are detected and can be attributed in whole or in part to the project, a rating should be assigned to the particular impact domain. On the other hand, if no changes are detected and no intervention was foreseen or intended, then no rating (or the mention "not applicable") is assigned.

Theory of Change of CBARDP



List of key persons met

Abuja

Professor Yayok, former IFAD consultant

Mr Kukah, M&E

Shola Oyebanji

Mr Coker, IFAD, M&E consultant

M.O Azeez, Director, DRD/NPC-NPFS

D.A. Babalola, National Bureau of Statistics

Emusiri Ojo, National Bureau of Statistics

Peter S. Olorunfemi, Computec Limited

Jigawa State

Dr Idris Danzomo, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Dutse

Umar Madaki Abubakar, State Programme Officer, State Support Office Dutse

Isa Mohammed, HPFMU, MOF

Ainau Ibrahim, State Gender and Vulnerable Groups Officer, IFAD

Ado Nasiru, SCIE, State Support Office Dutse

Isyaku Hamza Taura, Programme Officer, Taura Local Government

Muhammed Ahmed G, Programme Officer, Guri Local Government

Muhd B. Birniwa, Programme Officer, Biniwa

Isyaku Garba Mohd, Programme Officer, Buji Local Government

Ahmed Zakar Auyo, Programme Officer, Auyo Local Government

Kabiru Haruna Garki, Programme Officer, Garki Local Government

Saidu Ali Garki, Media, Jigawa State Agricultural and Rural Development Authority

Lawan B. Ahmed, Programme Officer, Kiyawa

Magaji Galadima, State Community Driven Development Officer, State Support Office Dutse

Muhammad I Alhaji, I.A, State Support Office

Aliyu Saleh, STS, Dutse

Muazu Abdulmumini, Programme Officer, Gwiwa

Mohd Uba, Sustainable Agricultural Development Officer, State Support Office Dutse

Shayau Umar, Cashier, State Support Office

Yakubu Sule, Programme Officer, Dutse Local Government

Yahaya Buba, SREDFLSO, State Support Office Dutse

Alhaji M. Garba, DPRS, MO Env.

Bashir Isah, SPA, State Support Office Dutse

Yau Nuhu Katanga, State Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, State Support Office Dutse

Mohammed Idris Hdj, DD, Dutse

Abdullahi Ayuba K., DPO, State Support Office Dutse

Adamu Bala Isa, State Capacity Building Management and Training Officer, State Support Office

Gambo Ibrahim Aliyu, MD-JARDA, Dutse

Village areas

Dan Gambo, Dutse, Kwadiya

Maimuna, Dutse, Kwadiya

Amina, Dutse, Kwadiya

Muhammad Maishago, Auyo, Auyokayi

Hudu Magaji, Auyo, Auyakayi

Danladi, Auyo, Shawara-Auyakay

Garba Hassan, Auyo, Kwadiya

Hamza Kofa, Taura, Bardo

Umar Mohamed, Taura, Bardo

Sokoto State

Aminu Aliyu D/Daji, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Prof. A. L. Ala, Usman Dan Fodiyo University Sokoto

Sani Abubakar Zaki, Feed The Nation Future

Muhammad Kabir Sani, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Bello Malami, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Yahaya Hassan Gangara, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Abdullahi Asada, AgroChemical Agency Ltd

Ya' u s. Baki, Elmihien Ltd.

Nura Garba k., Ministry For Rural Development

Olaniyi Idowu Femi, Premier Seeds Nigeria Ltd.

Muhmmmad Abdullahi Janzomo, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Lydia k. Musa, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Mansur Sa' idu Kilgori, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Abubakar Naiya Muhammad, Ministry for Local Government and Community Development

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Umar Abu Dagawa, Fadama III-Sokoto
Galadima Bagodu, Chairman All Famers Association Nigeria (CAFAN)
Bashir A. Gagi, IFAD-CBARDP-Sokoto

Village areas

Halima S. Rima, Goronyo
Garba Marafan Awakala, Goronyo
Abdulsalam, Rimawa
Ummi Sirajo, Rimawa

Katsina State

Bashir Bala Zango, ADP
Iyal Abdulkadir, ADP
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Kasim Sada, former State Programme Officer CBARDP
Tukur Auwalu Bindawa, KSACDP
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Kabir Rabe, State Programme Officer/CBARDP
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Husaina Y Mashi, CBARDP/Gender
Binta Fatima Tukur, CBARDP
Zainab Abdulrahman, CBARDP
Ibrahim Idah, CBARDP/Engineer
Suleiman Umar, CBARDP/Accountant
Abba S Jamu, ADP
Dikko Sirajidden, CBARDP/IFAD
Tunde Abdulhakkem, CBARDP/IFAD
Alhassan Hashimu, ADP
Iyal Nasir, CBARDP/IAF

Village areas

Ammani Dahiru, Kaita, Abdallawa
Alh Hassan Kaita, Abdallawa
Rabi, Kaita, Abdallawa
Dahara, Kaita, Abdallawa
Mama Hadiza, Kaita, Abdallawa
Hore Sani, Kaita, Yanhoho
Hussaini Abashi, Kaita, Yanhoho
Zainab, Kaita, Yanhoho
Ramatu, Kaita, Yanhoho
Iya, Kaita, Yanhoho
Maryam Hamisu, Jibiya, Daga
Saadatu Audu, Jibiya, Daga
Baraka, Jibiya, Gaiwa
Yahanasu Hassan, Bindawa, Gaiwa
Duduwa Badamasi, Bindawa, Gaiwa
Atiku Kado, Bindawa, Gaiwa
Muhamed Nasiru, Bindawa, Gaiwa
Masaudu Ismail, Bindawa, Gaiwa
Mal Jamilu, Bindawa, Yanhoho
Lawal Abubakar, Kaita, Yanhoho
Rabe Sani, Kaita, Yahoho
Adamu Bello, Kaita, Yahoho
Sani Abdul, Kaita, Yahoho
Sani Abdu, Kaita

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Abdulrasheed Umar, State Programme Accountant
Garba Salihu Danko, State Community Infrastructure Officer
Bala Mohammed Birnin Kebbi, State Rural Enterprise Development and Financial Linkage Services Officer
Garba Usman Argungu, State Capacity Building, Management and Training Officer
Emmanuel Bonde, Sustainable Agricultural Development Officer
Hafsat A.Abuga, State Gender and Vulnerable Groups Officer
Shehu A. Bello, State Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
Aliyu Dan Hakimi, State Community Driven Development Officer
Sani Jega, State Internal Auditor

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Sabatu Ereh, Deputy Gender

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